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Maastricht -verdrag 1992 - Geskiedenis

Maastricht -verdrag 1992 - Geskiedenis


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Op 7 Februarie 1992 is die Maastricht -verdrag onderteken om die Europese Unie tot stand te bring. Die Unie was 'n stap in die rigting van groter integrasie van die vorige gemeenskaplike mark.


In Desember 1991 begin onderhandelinge tussen die nasies van die gemeenskaplike mark om die omvang van hul verhouding uit te brei na net ekonomiese handel. Die nuwe verdrag het die samewerking uitgebrei tot 'n gemeenskaplike buitelandse en verdedigingsbeleid, terwyl dit ook samewerking op die gebied van justisie en binnelandse sake tot stand gebring het. Die verdrag het die ekonomiese samewerking tussen die lande verder geïntegreer, wat gelei het tot die skepping van 'n gemeenskaplike geldeenheid, die Euro.

Die verdrag is daarna voorgelê vir bekragtiging deur die deelnemers. Drie provinsies is gedwing om referendum te hou: Denemarke, Frankryk en Ierland. In al drie gevalle is die verdrag uiteindelik met die kleinste marges bekragtig.


Maastricht -verdrag 1992 - Geskiedenis

Die Verdrag oor die Europese Unie is in Maastricht onderteken in die teenwoordigheid van die president van die Europese Parlement, Egon Klepsch. In ooreenstemming met daardie verdrag is die Unie gebaseer op die Europese gemeenskappe (eerste pilaar), met twee bykomende samewerkingsgebiede (tweede en derde pilaar): die gemeenskaplike buitelandse en veiligheidsbeleid (GVVB) en justisie en binnelandse sake (JBV).

By die inwerkingtreding van die Verdrag oor die Europese Unie word die EEG die Europese Gemeenskap (EG). Die wetgewende en toesighoudende bevoegdhede van die EP neem toe met die bekendstelling van die medebesluitingsprosedure en die uitbreiding van die samewerkingsprosedure.

Ingevolge die nuwe Verdrag het die Europese Parlement die reg om die Kommissie uit te nooi om 'n wetgewingsvoorstel voor te lê oor aangeleenthede wat na sy mening 'n gemeenskapsbesluit moet opstel. Die hele kommissie moet ook nou goedgekeur word deur die EP, wat ook die Europese ombudsman aanstel.


Vrye beweging in Europa: verlede en hede

Burgers van die Europese Unie is vry om binne-Europese grense oor te steek op soek na werk- en opvoedingsgeleenthede, 'n hoër lewenstandaard of selfs 'n meer gewenste klimaat. Duitsers werk in die finansiesektor in Londen en Luxemburg, jong Litouwers werk in kitskosrestaurante in Ierland, Italianers studeer aan Britse universiteite en Swede tree af in die sonnige Spanje.

As 'n gebied van 27 lande met meer as 500 miljoen inwoners, is die Europese Unie tans die beste navorsingslaboratorium ter wêreld oor wettige, transnasionale migrasie.

Maar hoe het so 'n gebied van vrye beweging tot stand gekom? Waarom het die soewereine state van Europa besluit om afstand te doen van een van die fundamentele regte wat 'n nasiestaat definieer - om te besluit wie sy grense kan oorsteek? En met watter doel?

Hierdie artikel gee 'n kort oorsig van die geskiedenis van die Europese vrybewegingsregime en bespreek hoe mobiliteit in Europa gedurende die afgelope 60 jaar bevorder en benut is, die uitbreiding van die EU in Sentraal- en Oos -Europa in 2004 en 2007 en die impak daarvan op intra -Europese migrasie en die uitdagings wat regerings in hierdie nuwe era van mobiliteit in die EU in die gesig staar.

Na-oorlogse ekonomiese groei en gratis mobiliteit

In die afgelope 60 jaar het Europa 'n verskuiwing ondergaan van 'n gebied van netto emigrasie na een van netto immigrasie. Gedurende hierdie tyd het 'n geleidelike vermindering van die beperkings op arbeidsmobiliteit tussen sekere Europese lande plaasgevind.

Op 'n manier is hierdie oopmaak van grense 'n terugkeer na die verlede. Voor die aanvang van die Eerste Wêreldoorlog in 1914 was daar feitlik geen grensbeheer of beperkings op arbeidsmobiliteit oor die hele vasteland nie. Tydens die oorlog word die oorsteek van grense deur buitelanders egter as 'n bekommernis oor die veiligheid beskou, en dit was in hierdie tyd dat paspoorte en visums in Europa ingestel is.

Toe in die vyftigerjare, toe Europa begin herstel het van die verwoesting van die Tweede Wêreldoorlog en 'n tydperk van intense ekonomiese groei beleef het, is arbeidsmobiliteit weer aangemoedig. Omdat die gebrek aan geskoolde werkers as 'n bedreiging vir die ekonomie beskou word, is bewegingsvryheid van gekwalifiseerde nywerheidswerkers ingesluit in die verdrae wat die Europese Ekonomiese Gemeenskap (EEG), die voorganger van die huidige Europese Unie, in 1957 gestig het.

Meer as 8 miljoen werkpermitte is uitgereik aan buitelanders in België, Frankryk, Italië, Luxemburg, Nederland en Wes-Duitsland (die oorspronklike ses lede van die EEG) gedurende die gas-werkersperiode van 1958 tot 1972. Een derde van die buitelandse werkers kom uit die EEG, hoofsaaklik uit Italië, wat in industrialisasie agtergebly het en onder hoë werkloosheid gely het.

Werkers is ook gewerf deur middel van bilaterale ooreenkomste van buite Europa, veral om in vuil, gevaarlike en saai-die sogenaamde 3D-werksgeleenthede in die bou-, mynbou- en vervoersektor te werk. 'N Beduidende aantal gaswerkers het byvoorbeeld van Turkye na Duitsland, van Algerië na Frankryk en van die Britse Gemenebes -lande na Brittanje getrek.

Die oliekrisis wat in 1973 begin het, het 'n einde gemaak aan die oop-deure-beleid rakende trekarbeiders, wat verwelkom is toe die ekonomie dit nodig gehad het, maar wat na verwagting sou vertrek. Tot die verbasing van die gasheernasies het die meeste gaswerkers egter kom bly. Boonop het baie van hierdie migrante hul gesinne genooi om by hulle in die bestemmingslande aan te sluit, wat familiebande 'n meer prominente oorsaak van wettige migrasie na Europa maak as aktiewe werwing. Die Switserse skrywer Max Frisch het hierdie dilemma netjies saamgevat: "Ons het werkers gevra, maar daar het mense gekom."

Uitbreiding van bewegingsvryheid: van werkers tot burgers

Die reg op vrye beweging was aanvanklik bedoel vir die ekonomies aktiewe bevolking: werkers wat hulself in die land van bestemming kon onderhou. Die tekste van die stigtingsverdrae van die EEG, sowel as die implementering van sekondêre wetgewing, het egter ruimte gelaat vir interpretasie.

Europese burgers het jare lank die grense van vrye mobiliteit aktief getoets deur nasionale administratiewe besluite in die Europese Hof van Justisie uit te daag, wat sedert die sewentigerjare 'n fundamentele rol gespeel het in die verbreding van die omvang van vrye beweging.

Die uitsprake van die hof sedert daardie tyd het beleid geleidelik verskuif van die beskerming van hoofsaaklik vrye beweging van werkers tot die vrye beweging van persone. In talle individuele gevalle het die hof beslis dat 'n lidstaat van die EEG nie toegang tot 'n burger van 'n ander EEG -staat op grond van persoonlike gedrag kan weier nie, tensy daardie gedrag ewe strafmaatreëls sou regverdig as dit deur 'n burger van die voormalige staat.

Die definisie van 'werker' is ook geleidelik uitgebrei om nie net werknemers in die nywerheid nie, maar ook werknemers in seisoenale of kort termyn indiensneming en vakleerlingplasing ook in die lidlande in te sluit. In 1990 word die vryheid van beweging gewaarborg vir studente, pensioenarisse en werkloses sowel as vir hul gesinne.

Die proses om vrye beweging vir alle onderdane van die lidstate tot stand te bring, is afgehandel met die ondertekening van die Maastricht -verdrag in 1992, wat die Europese Unie (EU) tot stand gebring het en die konsep van 'n gemeenskaplike Europese burgerskap ingevoer het.

Namate die proses om migrasie aan te moedig en reisbeperkings aan te moedig, voortgesit word, word klem gelê op die vermindering van grensbeheerformaliteite in Europa. Die Schengen -ooreenkoms, wat vir die eerste keer in 1995 in werking getree het, het 'n gemeenskaplike, in wese grenslose gebied tussen België, Frankryk, Duitsland, Luxemburg, Nederland, Portugal en Spanje geskep, waarin reisbewyse slegs aan die buitegrense van hierdie gebied vereis word.

Twee jaar later is die Schengen-reëls in die Verdrag van Amsterdam opgeneem, en teen 1999 was Europese burgers vry om die meeste intra-Europese grense oor te steek sonder om hul paspoorte te hoef te toon. Met die skryf hiervan omvat die Schengen -gebied 25 Europese lande, waarvan drie nie lede van die Europese Unie is nie.

EU -uitbreiding: die mobiliteit van Sentraal- en Oos -Europeërs

In Mei 2004 het die 15 state van die Europese Unie (EU-15) tien nuwe lidmate verwelkom in die grootste uitbreiding in die geskiedenis van Europese integrasie.

Die nuwe lidstate het agt lande (ook die A-8 genoem) van die ander kant van die voormalige ystergordyn ingesluit: Tsjeggië, Hongarye, Pole, Slowakye, Slowenië en die drie Baltiese state Estland, Letland en Litaue, wat was nog net 13 jaar tevore deel van die Sowjetunie. Terselfdertyd is lidmaatskap verleen aan die eilandstate Ciprus en Malta.

Die uitbreiding was die teiken van baie omstredenheid, aangesien mediaskattings oor die moontlike golf van ekonomies gemotiveerde migrasie uit die Sentraal- en Oos -Europese lande wissel van 5 miljoen tot 40 miljoen mense. Die migratietempo is na raming hoog omdat die inkomsteverskille en die lewenstandaard tussen die nuwe lidstate en die EU-15 groot was: in 2003 was die gemiddelde loon in Letland-die armste onder die nuwe lidstate-net een agtste van die gemiddelde loon in die EU-15.

Alhoewel vorige uitbreidings van die Europese Unie nie gelei het tot groot uitvloei van werkers uit nuwe lidstate nie, is hierdie tyd vermoedelik anders. Daar is gevrees dat onbeperkte arbeidsmigrasie van die A-8 ernstige probleme vir die arbeidsmarkte van die EU-15 sou veroorsaak. Soortgelyke vrese met betrekking tot loonstorting en moontlike 'welsyns-toerisme' vir die EU-15 is weer uitgespreek toe Bulgarye en Roemenië in 2007 by die Europese Unie aangesluit het.

Tydens die toetredingsonderhandelinge is 'n oorgangstydperk van sewe jaar vasgestel sodat elke ou lidstaat kon bepaal wanneer hy gereed is om sy grense oop te maak vir werkers uit die nuwe lidstate. Die oorgangsmaatreëls was gebaseer op 'n "2+3+2 -model", waar die beperkings op die toegang tot die arbeidsmark van nuwe burgers na twee jaar, en weer drie jaar later, hersien moes word. 'N Laaste fase van twee jaar van beperkings is slegs toegelaat in gevalle van ernstige steurnisse binne die individuele arbeidsmarkte van die EU-15. (Die beperkings was nie van toepassing op die burgers van Ciprus en Malta nie.)

Die vrye beweging tussen alle lidstate sou dus teen die einde van Mei 2011 gewaarborg word vir die burgers van die lande wat in 2004 aangesluit het, en teen Januarie 2014 vir die burgers van Bulgarye en Roemenië.

Slegs drie lidstate - Ierland, Swede en die Verenigde Koninkryk - het besluit om hul grense onmiddellik oop te maak, eersgenoemde twee hoofsaaklik omdat hul groeiende en relatief oop ekonomieë arbeid nodig het, en laasgenoemde omdat die gereguleerde arbeidsmark vermoedelik in stand kon bly lone op die kollektief ooreengekome vlakke.

Boonop word immigrasie destyds in hierdie lande nie as so 'n beduidende bedreiging beskou nie, in teenstelling met byvoorbeeld in Frankryk, waar 'n fiktiewe karakter met die naam 'Poolse loodgieter' gebruik is om die vrees oor hoe bekwame Franse werkers binnekort aan te wakker was, beskou vervang word deur 'n vloed Oos -Europeërs wat bereid is om vir minder te werk.

Ongeveer 70 persent van die migrante van die A-8 is sedertdien op pad na Ierland en die Verenigde Koninkryk. Migrante uit Bulgarye en Roemenië, daarenteen, het meestal gekies om na Italië en Spanje te gaan.

Na die uitbreiding in 2004 was Pole die bron van die grootste aantal trekarbeiders onder alle nuwe lidlande. Trouens, die aantal Pole wat 'tydelik' in 'n ander EU -lidstaat woon, het meer as verdubbel tussen 2004 en 2007, met 'n hoogtepunt van ongeveer 2 miljoen - op daardie tydstip 'n merkwaardige 5,3 persent van die land se totale bevolking van 38 miljoen. Litaue het egter die grootste aantal uitgaande migrante in verhouding tot die omvang van sy arbeidsmag gehad, en sommige dele van die land het gely onder minstens 'n tydelike, maar tog baie sigbare, jeugdrein.

Oor die algemeen blyk dit dat die unieke geskiedenis, kulture, ekonomiese situasies en regeringsbeleid in elke nuwe lidstaat die aantal uitgaande migrante beïnvloed het. Vir sommige lande het die aansluiting by die Europese Unie die migrasie na buite nie aansienlik verhoog nie. Hongarye, waar plaaslike mobiliteit binne die land self en die belangstelling om in die buiteland te werk tradisioneel laag was, is een van hierdie gevalle.

Ondanks die oorgangsmaatreëls wat deur sommige lande-Oostenryk en Duitsland-geneem is, het die enigste twee ou lidstate wat verkies het om die toetrede van A-8-werknemers tot veral Mei 2011 te beperk, en die ander verskillende beperkings op toegang tot arbeidsmark werkers uit die nuwe lidlande in tydelike, selfstandige of informele posisies behou hul mobiliteit.

Visumbeperkings vir burgers uit Oos-Europese lande wat reis na die EU-15 beplan, is in 2001 opgehef, dus het die werklike arbeidsmobiliteit reeds plaasgevind voordat die nuwe lidmate amptelik by die Europese Unie aangesluit het en nog lank voordat die oorgangstydperke verby was. Bewyse hiervan kom uit die werkeregistrasiekema wat deur die Verenigde Koninkryk geïmplementeer is as 'n maatreël om migrante na die uitbreiding te monitor. In die ses maande na die uitbreiding in Mei 2004 kom ongeveer 30 persent van die aansoeke tot die skema van mense wat reeds voor die uitbreiding in die Verenigde Koninkryk gewoon het.

Intra-Europese migrante

Aangesien die oorgangstydperk wat die vrye beweging uit Bulgarye en Roemenië beperk, teen Januarie 2014 tot 'n einde kom, vorm Europa 'n gebied waar burgers uit 31 lande-die 27 lande van die Europese Unie (EU-27) plus Ysland, Liechtenstein, Noorweë en Switserland - kan woon, studeer of werk waar hulle wil. Die oorsteek van grense binne hierdie gebied is ongelooflik eenvoudig gemaak deur beleid, tegnologie, die reisbedryf en globalisering.

Maar hierdie werklikheid bied 'n belangrike probleem vir diegene wat Europese mobiliteit bestudeer: baie vorme van grensoverschrijdende bewegings binne hierdie gebied word nie getel deur amptelike statistieke nie. Europese burgers oorskry grense ongeregistreer, bly dikwels wesenlik onsigbaar in hul bestemmingslande en word verskillend getel, afhangende van hul land van herkoms en bestemming. In die Verenigde Koninkryk berus die meting van immigrasie byvoorbeeld hoofsaaklik op die aantal inwoners wat in die buiteland gebore is, terwyl dit in ander lande, soos Duitsland, bepaal word deur die aantal inwoners wat nie nasionale burgers is nie.

Die statistieke van emigrante is ook nie duidelik nie: Oostenrykers word as emigrante gekategoriseer as hulle hul land langer as drie maande verlaat, Belge na ses maande, Finne as hulle van plan is om langer as 'n jaar in die buiteland te bly, en Pole en Roemeniërs slegs as hulle dui aan dat hulle vir altyd vertrek.

Vanweë die groot variëteit in beleid oor lande, is burgerskap ook nie 'n betroubare manier om mobiliteit te verantwoord nie. België vereis byvoorbeeld drie jaar verblyf voordat burgerskap toegestaan ​​kan word, terwyl Oostenryk 'n minimum verblyf van tien jaar vereis. Kinders wat uit buitelandse burgers gebore is, is self vreemdelinge in sommige lande, soos in Swede en Finland, maar kan outomaties burgers word van hul geboorteland in ander, soos in die Verenigde Koninkryk en Ierland.

Om hierdie redes moet statistieke oor hoeveel intra-Europese migrante op 'n gegewe tydstip in 'n bepaalde lidstaat woon, met 'n greintjie sout geneem word. Daar is egter 'n paar insiggewende en relevante data.

Die algehele grootte van die bevolking

In Eurobarometer-opnames word bewegingsvryheid binne die EU-27 dikwels beskou as die beste prestasie van die Europese Unie, bo die euro, ekonomiese welvaart of selfs vrede. Tot die teleurstelling van die Europese Kommissie, wat bekommerd is oor ekonomiese groei en arbeidsbuigsaamheid, was die Europese burgers egter nogal traag om hierdie reg te benut.

Binne die EU-15 het die vlakke van intra-Europese mobiliteit relatief stabiel gebly. Die meerderheid buitelandse werkers kom voort van buite die Europese Unie, en die aandeel van mobiele EU-onderdane het laer gebly as wat dit was gedurende die dae van die gaste-werker-era van die 1960's.

In 2000 het ongeveer 5,1 persent van die totale EU-15-bevolking, oftewel 19 miljoen mense, gewoon in 'n land waarvan hulle nie 'n burger was nie. Die meerderheid van hierdie buitelandse burgers woon in Duitsland (37,0 persent), Frankryk (18,4 persent) en die Verenigde Koninkryk (10,2 persent). Slegs ongeveer 6 miljoen van die buitelandse burgers (1,6 persent) wat in 2000 in die Europese Unie woon, was onderdane van 'n ander EU -lidstaat, en die meerderheid van hulle woon ook in Duitsland (1,9 miljoen), Frankryk (1,2 miljoen) en die Verenigde Koninkryk (860 000).

Volgens EUROSTAT, die statistiese kantoor van die Europese Unie, het 31,9 miljoen buitelandse burgers in 2009 in die EU-27 gewoon, wat 6,4 persent van die totale EU-27-bevolking uitmaak. Ongeveer 'n derde, of 11,9 miljoen, was burgers van 'n ander EU-27-lidstaat.

Die gevolge van die oostelike vergrotings van 2004 en 2007 is sigbaar, nie net in die algehele syfers vir 2009 nie, maar ook as daar van mening is dat die twee grootste nasionale groepe in die EU -mobiele bevolking dié was van Roemenië (2,0 miljoen EU -migrante) en Pole (1,5 miljoen EU -migrante). Saam was hierdie twee groepe verantwoordelik vir 11 persent van alle buitelandse burgers wat in die EU-27 in 2009 woon. en EU -lande (2,4 miljoen).

Die aandeel buitelandse burgers wat in elke land woon, wissel van minder as 1 persent in Pole, Roemenië en Bulgarye tot 44 persent in Luxemburg. Wat getalle betref, was Duitsland weer die grootste deel van die buitelandse burgers in die EU-27 (2,5 miljoen) gevolg deur Spanje (2,3 miljoen), die Verenigde Koninkryk (1,6 miljoen), Frankryk (1,3 miljoen) en Italië ( 1,1 miljoen).

Kenmerke van intra-Europese migrante in die EU-15

Die grootste poging wat tot dusver aangewend is om migrasie binne die EU te verstaan, was die navorsingsprojek Pioneers of European Integration (PIONEUR), wat tussen 2003 en 2006 plaasgevind het.

Die projek was gemik op bewegers tussen die vyf mees bevolkte EU-15-lidlande-Duitsland, Frankryk, Brittanje, Italië en Spanje-en het die European Internal Movers Social Survey (EIMSS) in 2004 gebruik om inligting te versamel oor die ervarings van byna 5000 Europeërs wat van een van hierdie lande na 'n ander verhuis het. Omdat intra-Europese migrante nie maklik uit bevolkingsregisters opgespoor kan word nie, het die opname 'n objektiewe naamgebaseerde monsternemingstegniek gebruik om hierdie populasie te bereik.

Die opname het vier algemene migrantetipes in die EU-15 aan die lig gebring: laat-tradisionele migrante wat die ou arbeidsmigrasiepatrone in die suid-noord voortgaan, aftree-migrante wat van noord na suid trek, middeljarige voor-aftree-migrante en 'n klas hoogs mobiele jongmense. Europese professionele persone.

Vir die Europeërs van die EIMSS -opname was ekonomiese oorwegings of verskille in loonvlakke nie so prominent motiewe om te beweeg as wat tradisionele ekonomiese teorieë oor migrasie sou suggereer nie. Trouens, die mees algemene redes vir mobiliteit het verband gehou met liefde en familie: "om saam met lewensmaat/eggenoot/kinders te woon" het die hoogste antwoord op 29,7 persent gekry. Die tweede belangrikste redes het verband gehou met leefstyl en die omgewing: "om in 'n beter natuurlike omgewing te leef" het 15,7 persent van die reaksies opgelewer, gevolg deur "om in beter/gesonder weer te leef, klimaat te geniet" met 13,5 persent. Onder die ekonomiese of werkverwante motiverings om te verhuis, het 'om 'n werkaanbod te aanvaar' die grootste deel van die antwoorde op 15,2 persent gekry.

Die PIONEUR-projek het aan die lig gebring dat die Europese migrasie, ten minste tussen die EU-15, deur die jare verander het deur hoofsaaklik minder geskoolde ekonomiese migrante by blouboordjie-beroepe te betrek na die mobiliteit van opgeleide en hoogs geskoolde, wat dikwels uit hoër- of hoër-middelklas gesinne.

Toe die vrybewegingsregime 60 jaar gelede begin is, was dit bedoel om personeellede aan te moedig om grense oor te steek vir tydelike werk in die industriële sektor. Nou gebruik 'n wye verskeidenheid Europeërs hierdie reg.

In 2009 het Eurobarometer 27 000 individue uit die EU-27 ondervra oor hul mobiliteitservarings en voornemens. Die verslag, wat in 2010 uitgereik is, dui aan dat EU-burgers uit die meer onlangs ingelyfde lidlande meer gemotiveerd is om in die buiteland te werk en hul land van bestemming te kies op grond van ekonomiese oorwegings, terwyl diegene uit die EU-15 meer geneig is om dit te oorweeg leefstyl en kulturele faktore in hul besluite om te migreer. Hierdie bevindinge versterk die bevindinge van die EIMSS -opname van ongeveer vyf jaar tevore.

Dit blyk dat ten minste vir nou twee uiteenlopende mobiliteitspatrone in die huidige Europese konteks bestaan, en dat hierdie twee groepe gereeld in ietwat verskillende terme beskou word op grond van die redes vir hul migrasie: meer welvarende EU-15-migrante word dikwels beskryf as 'mobiele Europeërs', terwyl daar na diegene wat uit die nuwe lidlande kom, 'immigrante' genoem word, en diskriminasie in die gesig staar ongeag hul status as burgerskap in die EU.

Regerings in die lidstate sukkel byvoorbeeld om maniere te vind om openbare frustrasie wat met die Roma -bevolking verband hou, te hanteer op 'n manier wat verenigbaar is met EU -wetgewing en universele menseregte.

Duisende Roma, wat uit Roemenië, Bulgarye en ander lande in Oos -Europa gedryf is deur armoede en diskriminasie, woon in onwettige kampe aan die buitewyke van groot Wes- en Noord -Europese stede. In die somer van 2010 het Frankryk 'n internasionale oproer veroorsaak deur talle Roma -nedersettings af te breek en diegene wat hulle beset het te verdryf, ondanks die feit dat hierdie individue EU -burgers was met die beskermde reg op vrye mobiliteit.

Maar Europeërs is nie die enigste bevolking wat die reg op vrye beweging binne Europa benut nie. Onder die grense van die Europese Unie en die Schengen-gebied, trek burgers van derde lande ook voordeel uit gratis mobiliteit in die praktyk - ongeag of hulle toestemming het om wettiglik in ander lande te woon of te werk - weens die gebrek aan interne grenskontroles. Die implikasies van hierdie werklikheid, tesame met die hedendaagse uitdagings wat die buitegrense van Europa in die gesig staar, het groot vrymoedigheid geplaas.

Griekeland se onlangse probleme met grensveiligheid en die kommer van sommige lidmate dat Bulgarye en Roemenië poreuse toegangspunte tot die Europese Unie sal word sodra hulle by die Schengen -gebied aansluit, is voorbeelde van sulke uitdagings. Boonop het die onlangse opstande in Noord-Afrika en die daaropvolgende aankoms van migrante uit konflikgedrewe lande na Italië en Malta die debat aangaande vrye mobiliteit aangewakker en sommige regerings die regverdigheid laat twyfel van 'n stelsel waarmee lande in die eksterne grense van Europa om die grootste deel van die verantwoordelikhede oor grensbeheer te dra.

Vrye mobiliteit en die Schengen -stelsel is nie statiese konsepte nie, en die verhoudings waarop dit berus, sal voortgaan om te ontwikkel. Alhoewel dit waarskynlik nie 'n afbreuk doen aan die oorkoepelende beginsel en praktyk van bewegingsvryheid in Europa nie, is dit moontlik dat hedendaagse ontwikkelings solidariteit en vertroue tussen die lidlande sal toets.

Adinolfi, Adelina. 2005. "Vrye beweging en toegang tot werk van burgers van die nuwe lidlande: die oorgangsmaatreëls". Common Law Review 42: 2, 469-498.

Baldoni, Emiliana. 2003. Die vrye beweging van persone in die Europese Unie: 'n Regshistoriese oorsig. State of the Art verslag. PIONEUR -werkstuk nr. 2. Beskikbaar aanlyn.

Bauer, Thomas K, en Zimmermann Klaus F. 1999. Evaluering van moontlike migrasiedruk en die impak daarvan op die arbeidsmark na die uitbreiding van die EU na Sentraal- en Oos -Europa. IZA -navorsingsverslag nr. 3. Bonn: Instituut vir die Studie van Arbeid (IZA). Beskikbaar aanlyn.

Borbély, Szilvia. 2009. "Arbeidsemigrasie: beleid van die regering en maatskaplike vennote in Hongarye." In Galgóczi, Béla, Leschke, Janine en Watt, Andrew. reds. 2009. Arbeidsmigrasie van die EU sedert die uitbreiding. Tendense, impakte en beleide. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing.

Braun, Michael en Arsene, Camelia. 2009. "Die demokrasie van bewegers en verblyf in die Europese Unie". In Recchi, Ettore en Favell, Adrian, red. 2009. Pioniers van Europese integrasie. Burgerskap en mobiliteit in die EU. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 26-51

Carmel, Emma. 2011. "Migrasiebestuur van die Europese Unie: nut, veiligheid en integrasie." In Carmel, Emma, ​​Cerami, Alfio, Papadopoulos, Theodoros. Eds. 2011. Migrasie en welsyn in die nuwe Europa. Sosiale beskerming en die uitdagings van integrasie. Bristol: Policy Press, 49-66.

Europese Kommissie. 2010. Geografiese en arbeidsmarkmobiliteit. Rapporteer. Spesiale Eurobarometer 337 / Wave 72.5 - TNS Opinion & amp Social. Beskikbaar aanlyn.

———. 2008. Indiensneming in Europa 2008. Brussel: Europese gemeenskappe, Direktoraat-generaal vir indiensneming, maatskaplike aangeleenthede en gelyke geleenthede. Beskikbaar aanlyn.

———. 2007. Openbare mening in die Europese Unie. Standaard Eurobarometer 67/ lente 2007 - TNS Opinion & amp Social. Beskikbaar aanlyn.

Europese Integrasie Konsortium. 2009. Arbeidsmobiliteit binne die EU in die konteks van uitbreiding en die werking van die oorgangsreëlings. Finale verslag. Nürnberg: IAB, CMR, fRDB, GEP, WIFO, wiiw. Beskikbaar aanlyn.

Eurostat. 2010. Buitelanders in die EU is uiteenlopend en grootliks jonger as die onderdane van die EU -lidlande. Statistiek in fokus 45/2010, skrywer Katya Vasileva. Luxemburg: Eurostat. Beskikbaar aanlyn. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-10-045/EN/KS-SF-.

Fassman, Heinz, Reeger, Ursula, en Sievers, Wiebke, reds. 2009. Statistiek en werklikheid. Konsepte en metings van migrasie in Europa. IMISCOE verslae. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Favell, Adrian. 2008. Eurostars en Eurocities: vrye beweging en mobiliteit in 'n integrerende Europa. Malden: Blackwell Publishing.

Favell, Adrian. 2008. "The New Face of East-West Migration in Europe." Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 34: 5, 701-716. DOI: 10.1080/13691830802105947

Favell, Adrian, en Recchi, Ettore. 2009. "Pioniers van Europese integrasie: 'n inleiding." In Recchi, Ettore en Favell, Adrian, red. 2009. Pioniers van Europese integrasie. Burgerskap en mobiliteit in die EU. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1-25.

Galgóczi, Béla, Leschke, Janine en Watt, Andrew. 2009. Intre-EU arbeidsmigrasie: vloei, gevolge en beleidsreaksies. ETUI Werkstuk 2009/03. Brussel: European Trade Union Institute (ETUI). Beskikbaar aanlyn.

Gilpin, Nicola, Henty, Matthew, Lemos, Sara, Portes, Jonathan en Bullen, Chris. 2006. Die impak van vrye beweging van werknemers uit Sentraal- en Oos -Europa op die Britse arbeidsmark. Afdeling werk en pensioene Werkstuk nr. 29. Leeds: Korporatiewe dokumentdienste. Beskikbaar aanlyn.

Kahanec, Martin, Zaiceva, Anzelika, en Zimmermann, Klaus F. 2009. Lesse van migrasie na die uitbreiding van die EU. IZA -besprekingsvraestelle 4230. Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). Beskikbaar aanlyn.

King, Russel. 2002. "Op pad na 'n nuwe kaart van Europese migrasie." International Journal of Population Geography 8: 2, 89-106. DOI: 10.1002/ijpg.246.

Koikkalainen, Saara. 2009. "Europa is my oester: ervarings van Finne wat in die buiteland werk." Finse tydskrif vir etnisiteit en migrasie 4: 2, 27-38. Beskikbaar aanlyn.

Koikkalainen, Saara, Tammilehto, Timo, Kangas, Olli, Katisko, Marja, Koskinen, Seppo en Suikkanen, Asko. 2011. "Welsyn of werk: selektiewe integrasie van migrante in Finland." In Carmel, Emma, ​​Cerami, Alfio, Papadopoulos, Theodoros. Eds. 2011. Migrasie en welsyn in die nuwe Europa. Sosiale beskerming en die uitdagings van integrasie. Bristol: Policy Press, 143-158.

Kornø Rasmussen, Hans. 1997. Geen toegang. Immigrasiebeleid in Europa. Reeks D: 28. Kopenhagen: Copenhagen Business School Press.

Krieger, Hubert. 2005. Migrasie -neigings in 'n vergrote Europa. Lewenskwaliteit in Europa -reeks. Dublin: Europese stigting vir verbetering en lewensomstandighede. Beskikbaar aanlyn.

Lundborg, Per. 2009. "Die dimensies en gevolge van EU -arbeidsmigrasie in Swede". In Galgóczi, Béla, Leschke, Janine en Watt, Andrew. reds. 2009. Arbeidsmigrasie van die EU sedert die uitbreiding. Tendense, impakte en beleide. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing.

Recchi, Ettore. 2005. Migrante en Europeërs: 'n uiteensetting van die vrye beweging van mense in die EU. AMID Working Paper Series 38/2005. Aalborg: Die Akademie vir Migrasie Studies in Denemarke, Aalborg Universiteit. Beskikbaar aanlyn.

Recchi, Ettore. 2008. "Staatsmobiliteit in die EU. Tendense, raaisels en gevolge." Europese verenigings 10: 2, 197-224. DOI: 10.1080/14616690701835287.

Recchi, Ettore, en Triandafyllidou, Anna. 2010. "Oorkruising, op pad Wes en Suid: mobiliteit, burgerskap en werk in die vergrote Europa". n G. Menz en A. Caviedes (reds), Arbeidsmigrasie in Europa, Londen: Palgrave Macmillan, 127-149.

Rusu, Ioana. 2011. "Migrasie in Hongarye: historiese erfenisse en differensiële integrasie" in Carmel, Emma, ​​Cerami, Alfio, Papadopoulos, Theodoros. Eds. 2011. Migrasie en welsyn in die nuwe Europa. Sosiale beskerming en die uitdagings van integrasie. Bristol: Policy Press, 159-176.

Papadopoulos, Theodoros. 2011. "Immigrasie en die verskeidenheid migrasie -integrasie -regimes in die Europese Unie". Carmel, Emma, ​​Cerami, Alfio, Papadopoulos, Theodoros. Eds. 2011. Migrasie en welsyn in die nuwe Europa. Sosiale beskerming en die uitdagings van integrasie. Bristol: Policy Press, 23-48.

Santacreu, Oscar, Baldoni, Emiliana en Albert, Maria C. 2009. "Besluit om te trek: migrasieprojekte in 'n integrerende Europa". In Recchi, Ettore en Favell, Adrian, red. 2009. Pioniers van Europese integrasie. Burgerskap en mobiliteit in die EU. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 52-71.

Zaizeva, Anzelika, en Zimmermann, Klaus F. 2008. Skaal, diversiteit en bepalers van arbeidsmigrasie in Europa. IZA -besprekingsvraestelle 3595. Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). Beskikbaar aanlyn.


3. Uitdagings en kontroversies

Die Tweede Wêreldoorlog het 'n definitiewe einde gemaak aan die Europese oorheersing van die wêreld, en die Europeërs het baie van hul eie swakhede besef. Die twee nuwe supermoondhede van die wêreld (die Verenigde State en die Sowjetunie) was ekonomies, polities en militêr uiters beter as die Europese nasies. Die VSA het 'n gesentraliseerde Europese organisasie bevorder wat die lewering van die hulpbronne van die Marshall-plan (wat bedoel is om oorloggeteisterde Europa te herstel en te herbou) kan organiseer. Vir hierdie doel is die Organisasie vir Europese Ekonomiese Samewerking (OEEC) in 1948 gestig, wat die eerste instelling geword het wat Wes -Europese samewerking op belangrike multilaterale gebiede bevorder het. Die grondwet van die Noord -Atlantiese Verdragsorganisasie (NAVO) het beteken dat Europese lande nou saam sou veg teen 'n gemeenskaplike kommunistiese vyand in plaas van onder mekaar.


Waarom word die Maastricht -verdrag so belangrik geag?

Vandag kan ons sê dat die Lissabon -verdrag die belangrikste dokument in die Europese Unie (EU) is. Dit is die nuutste verdrag, die mees onlangse, en dit bepaal hoe Europese instellings werk. Vorige verdrae moet egter nie as minder belangrik beskou word nie. As ons dink aan die evolusie van die EU en hoe dit ontstaan ​​het, kan ons sê dat elke verdrag krediet het vir wat gebeur het. Yet, certain treaties have had more impact on European integration than others. The Treaty on European Union (TEU), signed in Maastricht, was one of the most important agreements in the EU’s history. Indeed, not only did it reform the structure of the European Community (EC) through the establishment of a political union, and strengthen economic integration with the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), but it also enabled the stabilisation of political tensions within Europe at the end of the Cold War, and integrated a unified Germany into the EU. As a result of this treaty the EC could not be called as such anymore, and from that point on it had to be referred to as the European Union. With the Maastricht Treaty, the EC took a step forward in European integration and in uniting its member states. Nonetheless, even if governments were very enthusiastic about it, public opinion was very much concerned about where this integration would eventually lead, thus making the ratification of the treaty more difficult. This essay will focus first on what the TEU actually says, and on the major innovations of the treaty. Then, it will study the effects it had on, as well as the reaction of the member states and will determine why the ratification process was so long. Finally, we will try to understand why the treaty was so important for the EC, and what the catalysts were that brought together the member states to agree upon the Maastricht Treaty.

The principal change of the treaty, which brought about all the other innovations to follow, was the ‘three pillars’ structure of the EU organisation. The 3 pillars consist of the Single European Act (SEA), the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and the Justice and Home Affairs. Therefore, within this structure emerged a new political union, through the second and third pillar, and a monetary union, through the first pillar (Europa, 2007). The particularity of this organisation is that even if each pillar was designed to be independent from one another, “bridges” could be made, (Best in Laursen and Vanhoonacker, 1994a: 28) as the action of one community would generate issues in another. For instance, because of the creation of a Single European Market (SEM) borders had to be opened, and as a consequence visa policy throughout the EU zone had to be changed (ibid). Concerning decision making, the EC would remain supranational and communautaire, implying that member states would only play a secondary role, while the other two would stay on an intergovernmental level (ibid: 19). However, a significant difference between the SEA and Maastricht was that the European Parliament gained power over member states, especially from 1992 onwards, as it would “adopt acts in conjunction with the Council” (Europa, 2007). This was very important because it meant that the Parliament would be playing a direct role in European legislation and would have both the power to negotiate with and “say a definitive ‘no’ to the Council” (Vanhoonacker in Laursen and Vanhoonacker, 1994: 3 Best in Laursen and Vanhoonacker, 1994a: 33).

Therefore, one of the major innovations which the TEU brought with its three pillars structure was the establishment of a political union. There had already been some agreements on social policies after the SEA, but integration was more focused on the economic aspect of European cooperation. Before the TEU, one of the only forms of political unity that existed was the European Political Cooperation, which was mainly foreign policy related and consisted of “mutual information and consultation.” The Twelve, the member states at the time, would agree on adopting “common position” concerning events in the world (Best in Laursen and Vanhoonacker, 1994a: 19). However, it was quite difficult for them to find common ground for agreement, especially with the Yugoslavia crisis of 1990, for instance. First, the states could not agree on the whole situation and on what measures had to be taken in order to prevent a break-up. Second, when the break-up finally happened, the member states could not agree on whether the new states should be recognised. Hence, serious questions emerged on the unity of these European countries and many people wondered if the CFSP would actually work (Vanhoonacker in Laursen and Vanhoonacker, 1994: 7). Of course, it was eventually implemented during the creation of the Maastricht Treaty, and it was a way for the newly born EU to show that member states could cooperate because they had common interests in doing so, those of the union (Best in Laursen and Vanhoonacker, 1994a: 37).

Moreover, concerning social policies “Member States had already been cooperating in different forms,” (ibid: 39) mainly because of the SEA which had already defined common standards for the “health and safety of workers” (ibid: 32). Nevertheless, one of the treaty’s aims was to develop a bigger social dimension for the EU. Thus, it introduced extended cooperation between member states with more involved participation of the European legislative regarding social issues such as education, employment, or labour (ibid). Furthermore, a special citizenship for people of each member state was brought forward by the treaty. It did not only increase the social dimension of the union, but also developed a new political comprehensiveness because the EU was now acknowledging the fact that it was one entity which was formed by and worked for the citizens, rather than a body composed of different states driven by their national interests.

Another significant development of the EU that was brought by the TEU was the establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union. It was considered as “the strongest form” and the last step towards full economic integration (Healey, 1995: 7). Many agreements had been reached after the SEA that noted further cooperation would be needed. The plan that had already emerged in the 1980s was known as the 1992 project. The idea was to essentially have a Single European Market, where all trade barriers would be dropped, and where it “must lead to a more unified Community” (Delors in Cecchini, Catinat and Jacquemin, 1988: xi). The objective of this plan was to develop more efficient trade and boost growth and development within the EC (Baun, 1995: 608). Many agreements had already been made in the years before 1992, the Maastricht Treaty just made these commitments “legally binding” (Best in Laursen and Vanhoonacker, 1994a: 28). Hence, the declarations made in the TEU were “more a matter of legitimation than of innovation,” (ibid) but it would be the final touch for the single market (Europa, 2007). Therefore, with the union in the 1990s, economic integration would take the road of no-return. The consequences of a SEM and of the formation of a single currency would be irreversible actions for the EU (ibid: 17). What makes the EMU so significant today is the knowledge that each member state in 1992 realised that they would enter a permanent situation in which European integration would drive their policies, and that decisions taken during the writing of the treaty would be irrevocable no state would possibly be able to go back to its previous relative economic and political independence after ratification, yet they still agreed to it.

Amongst all the theories that explain European integration, neofunctionalism is quite relevant in explaining why the Maastricht was created. Indeed, neofunctionalists consider political integration and the creation of a monetary union as “inevitable outgrowth” or a spill-over of economic integration (Baun, 1995: 606). Their main belief is that through slow and gradual economic cooperation, European integration will follow. First, because this cooperation cannot happen if integration does not exist, Jacques Delores, the President of the Commission at the time, said that “without a new treaty, it would not be possible to make any significant progress” towards the EMU, (European NAvigator, n.d.) thus making the statement that for further integration, other forms of integration had to be achieved. Second, integration will develop and reach a point where any state involved in the integration process cannot decide to abandon it, because that process is too interlinked with national policies (McCormick, 2008: 9). Helmut Kohl, German Chancellor, stated that “monetary and political union were not separable but were instead two sides of the same coin” (Baun, 1995: 621). Therefore, the Maastricht Treaty had to happen eventually because of increased integration.

What happened after the TEU was written was very unexpected. It would have been sensible to think that the ratification process should have gone smoothly, given the good public opinion in the 1980s about the 1992 project, and the enthusiastic commitment of national governments to the EC. Nonetheless, the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty lasted almost two years and turned out to be quite a difficult process with many obstacles (Vanhoonacker in Laursen and Vanhoonacker, 1994: 3). First of all, the economic crises that hit Europe between 1992 and 1993 hindered the development of the EMU, as currencies devalued one by one which led to a partial collapse of the Exchange Rate Mechanism. Stagflation followed throughout the EC and the “economic problems had a negative effect on popular support for further European integration” (Vanhoonacker in Laursen and Vanhoonacker, 1994: 6).

One of the major blows to ratification was the Danish ‘no’ on their TEU referendum. It caused “a shock-wave throughout Europe,” (ibid: 5) as citizens in other states began to question and criticise the EC and its development. Once it was clear that people from Denmark were against the treaty opposition grew stronger in other countries. For instance, in France, President Mitterrand decided to call a ratification referendum, which only passed with a slight majority of 51%. Certain governments, such as that of the UK, took this opportunity to bargain and get what they wanted from the treaty. Out of the Twelve, four member states have been through major troubles because the ratification process had been “politically controversial” for them, these were Denmark, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany (Laursen in Laursen and Vanhoonacker, 1994: 295). Spain has been an issue as well, but the protests were minor compared to what occurred in other countries.

One of the main reasons why the Danish said ‘no’ to the treaty was because of European citizenship. Many people in the member states were afraid that the establishment of such a citizenship would impede their national one, causing a debate on national identity. However, that would not have happened if national governments had been more communicative about the treaty. It was not a problem of transparency, but rather of comprehension. The wording of such treaties is usually very complex and a majority of citizens could not understand it, as was the case in 1992. This is why governments launched campaigns that explained the content of the TEU in a language that normal people could assimilate (Vanhoonacker in Laursen and Vanhoonacker, 1994: 5). Nevertheless, it was not just an issue of misunderstanding, citizens were also genuinely concerned about the changes brought about by the Maastricht Treaty. After the referendum in France, the government had to confront serious issues as only little more than half of the population agreed with its decisions regarding the EU, and it had “serious questions as to popular support for a further deepening of European integration” (ibid: 6). In southern Europe, the Spanish were “facing unemployment rate of more than 20%,” so they truly doubted the capacity of the EC to be beneficial to Spain (ibid). As for the Germans, they were wary about losing their national currency and replacing it with a European currency (ibid: 5). The Danish, French, and all others eventually surrendered to the Maastricht Treaty, but public opinion is still an extremely important issue, as opposition parties grow stronger every year within the EU.

On a governmental level, national parliaments, especially the British one, and other national bodies, such as the Bundesbank in Germany, were very troubled. Indeed, both were exceedingly concerned with their sovereignty. First, the UK had been opposed to certain ideas of the TEU a while before ratification. It was mainly the Conservative party, with Thatcher and Major as Prime Ministers, which caused problems. It absolutely refused the third stage of the EMU, which was that of substituting its national currency with a common one, and this measure was seen by British right wing politicians as “a ‘conveyor belt to federalism’ and the definitive abandonment of national sovereignty” (Best in Laursen and Vanhoonacker, 1994b: 256). Furthermore, when Major came into power in the early 1990s, he was ready to cooperate with other member states regarding the CFSP, but he also wanted a certain leeway of independence, he said that “Where we can act together we will do so. Where we need to act on our own, we must be able to do so” (Major quoted in Best in Laursen and Vanhoonacker, 1994b: 255). Second, the Bundesbank in Germany gained power over the EC through the European Monetary System (EMS) because Germany was the biggest economy. Thus, it was unsatisfied because if the EMU was established it would lose sovereignty over its monetary policies and would have to take orders from the European Central Bank (Baun, 1995 607).

The issues that occurred during the ratification process were to some extent consequences of previous problems seen in the EC in the late 1980’s. Take for example the Bundesbank, it was willing to delay any plans for the EMU because it had already been “forced to accept against its strong disapproval rapid German monetary union,” and it felt it was losing control over Germany’s monetary stability (ibid: 617). The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 was a critical turning point for the world system as it announced the end of Cold War, but it was also an important event for the EC because it implied German unification, and a possible resurgent German threat. These logically had some consequences which created some issues in Europe that correlated to some extent. After the end of the Cold War the international economy and system changed drastically, and Europe did not know where it stood, but it definitely knew that it wanted to have an important and active role on the global stage (ibid: 605). However, that could only be possible through further integration of the EC. Though, that was not the major reason why the Maastricht Treaty was founded.

Since German unification was not debatable for Kohl, Chancellor of the FRG in 1989, it created high tensions within the EC because member states feared a renewal of German power and independence, which would force the country to draw back from the community (ibid: 609). Consequently, Franco-German relationships at the time suffered from a great loss of trust. Member states sought for an immediate deepening of integration because they did not trust Germany’s commitment to the EC. For Delors, significant steps to further integration were “the only satisfactory and acceptable response to the German question” (quoted in Baun, 1995: 609). Only the UK was against the idea, it believed that enlargement was the best thing to do as it would democratise Eastern Europe, while integration would strengthen Germany’s place in the EC (Baun, 1995: 610). France feared its loss of power over Germany and the only way to secure its influence was a significant increase in European integration, so it was mainly concerned about the role it would have in the EC once Germany became unified (ibid). Kohl was willing to prove to member states that a unified Germany was still a Germany committed to the EC, and that he was “in favor of deepening the EC.” He even stressed that unification and integration could go hand-in-hand and that they were “mutually reinforcing processes” (ibid: 610-611).

Therefore, under these circumstances the Treaty of Maastricht became a political bargaining game, principally between France and Germany, as each “viewed the agreement as a means of securing vital national interests” (ibid: 606). The Franco-German tensions decreased when an agreement was reached between both states that political integration would be discussed at the Intergovernmental Conference of 1992. However, some compromises had to be made. Kohl had to withdraw some of his ideas on political union, as that of a powerful European Parliament, in order to have the French government recognise the new states created by the break-up of Yugoslavia (ibid: 621). The fact that tension had arisen between France and Germany in the years preceding the TEU had been a shock for the EC as they were considered “the primary motor of European integration” (ibid: 619). Hence, when Mitterrand and Kohl jointly proposed an acceleration of the development of the monetary union and “called for new initiatives on political union,” it was a relief for the whole community and “of great symbolic importance” (ibid: 615, 619). From 1990 to 1992, there was a “close collaboration of the French and German governments to ensure that” the community survived and strengthened through the TEU, and that could only be explained by “the considerable political and symbolic importance attached to the treaty” (ibid: 623).

In conclusion, the Maastricht Treaty was not only significant because of what was in it the establishment of a political union and the EMU through a new ‘three pillars’ structure of the EU, but also because it made European citizens realise what was actually happening between countries. Furthermore, the fact that public opinion was so involved in the process of ratification shows how it was a big a step for every single person in the EC, politician or manual worker. Nonetheless, as Baun argues, “the Maastricht Treaty was essentially a political response by the EC and its member countries to German unification and the end of the cold war” (ibid). The drastic changes that the end of the Cold War brought caused the EC to develop a new treaty in order to adapt itself to this new world, but mainly to adapt itself to the reunification of Germany. However, the TEU was also a political instrument for Kohl who needed an excuse to substitute the Deutschmark hence the treaty helped him show his people that by signing it Germany had a substantial role in the EU and that to some extent its power and sovereignty were enhanced by it.

Best, E. (1994a) ‘The Treaty on European Union: What does it actually say and do?’ in Laursen, F. And Vanhoonacker, S. (eds.) The Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, London: Martinus Nijhoff Publisher.

Best, E. (1994b) ‘The United Kingdom and the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty’ in Laursen, F. And Vanhoonacker, S. (eds.) The Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, London: Martinus Nijhoff Publisher.

Delors, J. (1988) ‘A Common Objective’ in Cecchini, P., Catinat, M. And Jacquemin, A. The European Challenge 1992: the Benefits of a Single Market, Aldershot: Wildwood House.

European NAvigator (n.d.) ‘The Treaty of Maastricht’ [online], European NAvigator. Available at: http://www.ena.lu/treaty_maastricht-2-16468. Accessed on: 15 November 2010.

Healey, N.M. (1995) Economics of the New Europe: from Community to Union, London: Routledge.

Laursen, F. (1994) ‘The not-so-permissive consensus: thoughts on the Maastricht Treaty and the future of European integration’ in Laursen, F. And Vanhoonacker, S. (eds.) The Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, London: Martinus Nijhoff Publisher.

McCormick, J. (2008) Understanding the European Union, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Vanhoonacker, S. (1994) ‘From Maastricht to Karlsruhe: the Long Road to Ratification’ in Laursen, F. And Vanhoonacker, S. (eds.) The Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, London: Martinus Nijhoff Publisher.

Written by: Morgane Griveaud
Written at: Royal Holloway, University of London
Written for: Dr Alister Miskimmon
Date written: December 2010


History of the Stability and Growth Pact

The Stability and Growth Pact has evolved significantly along with the EU’s economic governance rules.

SGP Flexibility
The Commission issues guidance on how it will apply the SGP rules to strengthen the link between structural reforms, investment and fiscal responsibility in support of jobs and growth.

SGP review
A review of the ‘Six Pack’ and ‘Two Pack’ rules, which was called for in the legislation, determined that the legislation had contributed to the progress of fiscal consolidation in the EU. The review highlighted some strengths as well as possible areas for improvement, which will be discussed with the European Parliament and Member States.

Fiscal Compact
The importance of the budgetary targets set by the SGP’s Preventive Arm (the Medium-Term Objectives), are strengthened by a law known as the ‘Fiscal Compact’, which is part of an inter-governmental treaty, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG).

Two Pack
Adherence to the SGP is further strengthened by new laws, known as the ‘Two Pack,’ which reinforces economic coordination between Member States and introduces new monitoring tools. Further details on the implementation of the ‘Two Pack’ provisions are laid down in ‘Code of Conduct’ (last revised in November 2014).

Six Pack
The SGP is made more comprehensive and predictable with a major enhancement of the EU’s economic governance rules through a collection of new laws, known as the ‘Six Pack’. The monitoring of both budgetary and economic policies is organised under the European Semester and further details on the implementation of the SGP’s rules are laid down in a ‘Code of Conduct’ (last revised in September 2012).

SGP amendment
EU lawmakers amend the SGP to allow it to better consider individual national circumstances and to add more economic rationale to the rules to be complied with.

Corrective rules
The SGP’s corrective rules enter into force.

Preventive rules
The SGP’s preventive rules enter into force.

Stability and Growth Pact
EU Member States agree to strengthen the monitoring and coordination of national fiscal and economic policies to enforce the deficit and debt limits established by the Maastricht Treaty. The Stability and Growth Pact is born.

Maastricht Treaty signed
EU Member States sign the Maastricht Treaty, paving the way for the creation of the euro as the common currency of the EU. The treaty limits government deficits to 3 % of GDP and public debt levels to 60 %, so as to enable countries to share a single currency


European Union goes into effect

The Maastricht Treaty comes into effect, formally establishing the European Union (EU). The treaty was drafted in 1991 by delegates from the European Community meeting at Maastricht in the Netherlands and signed in 1992. The agreement called for a strengthened European parliament, the creation of a central European bank, and common foreign and security policies. The treaty also laid the groundwork for the establishment of a single European currency, to be known as the 𠇎uro.”

By 1993, 12 nations had ratified the Maastricht Treaty on European Union: Great Britain, France, Germany, the Irish Republic, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, Denmark, Luxembourg, Belgium, and the Netherlands. Austria, Finland, and Sweden became members of the EU in 1995. After suffering through centuries of bloody conflict, the nations of Western Europe were finally united in the spirit of economic cooperation.

In 2016, in what became known as "Brexit," the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union. 


The single market and its four freedoms are established: the free movement of goods, services, people and money is now a reality. More than 200 laws have been agreed since 1986 covering tax policy, business regulations, professional qualifications and other barriers to open frontiers. The free movement of some services is delayed.

Austria, Finland and Sweden join the EU. The 15 members now cover almost the whole of western Europe.

Member States: Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom, Greece, Spain and Portugal.

New Member States: Austria, Finland and Sweden.


Amsterdam Treaty, Nice and the Constitution for Europe

The Amsterdam Treaty amended and updated the other Treaties, and made a number of politically significant changes, particularly in the areas of fundamental rights, employment, and the free movement of persons.

A month after the Treaty of Amsterdam had come into force the Treaty of Nice was being negotiated. The pure purpose of the Nice Treaty was to prepare for enlargement, and to deal with the "Amsterdam leftovers". This was primarily concerned with changing the structure and decision making processes, to allow for the fact that the EU was now going to be an EU of 25 rather than 6, and it was no longer practical to carry on using the same systems that had been in place since the Treaty of Rome.

The Amsterdam Treaty introduced a consolidated version of the Community Treaties. The consolidated versions are linked below, and include the changes introduced by the Treaty of Nice.

The next proposed EU Treaty was the Constitution for Europe. The version put forward suggested one model for the future of Europe, which was rejected by the French and Dutch voters.


Maastricht History Facts and Timeline

Maastricht was founded in 50 BC as a Roman colony. Roman forces were, no doubt, drawn by its strategic location on the banks of the River Maas. They quickly built a military camp on either bank and named the settlement Mosae Trajectum.

A castle was constructed to defend the settlement, while a bridge was built over the river on the orders of Emperor Augustus. The bridge allowed trade to take place more easily between France and Germany.

Maastricht appears to have had considerable religious significance during its early history. By the 4th century AD, Christianity had taken hold here. The first church and religious community were founded by St. Servaas. Maastricht was also a bustling commercial city, with its bridge still playing a vital part in trade.


Rise to Prosperity

In 1220, Maastricht was granted the right to call itself a township. Ruled over by the Duke of Brabant and also the Prince Bishop of Liege, it is fair to say that this wasn't an easy alliance.

Maastricht rose to the peak of its prosperity in the 16th century. The city attracted craftsmen, particularly those who worked in precious metals. At that time, the Netherlands was ruled by the Spanish.

Spanish rule wasn't always popular, particularly in Maastricht. In 1576, the city rebelled against its masters. The revolt failed, however, and it wasn't until 1632 that Maastricht managed to free itself, returning to Dutch rule. Frederik Hendrik, the sovereign Prince of Orange, brought in a whole new era of political stability. More importantly, the new regime encouraged a greater degree of religious tolerance. Peaceful it may have been, but the city masters still upgraded its defences, just in case.

History of Modern Times

In the early 19th century, political boundaries were redrawn and a new state brought together Holland and Belgium. It was intended to act as a defence against neighbouring powers. By 1830, the union had disintegrated. Whilst Maastricht should technically have remained part of Belgium, it decided to stay loyal to Holland under the Dutch Royal House of Orange.

In the 19th century, the Industrial Revolution came to Maastricht. The city became known for its pottery factory under Petrus Dominicus Laurentius Regout, whilst also being associated with its plentiful paper mills. The speed with which the city grew was boosted with the arrival of the railway.

Maastricht's neutrality during World War One meant that the effects of war were perhaps less severely felt here. However, the city still suffered. Floods of refugees came in search of homes and food. During World War Two, Maastricht was occupied by German forces - they stayed until 1944. In the post-war era, the city entered a new period in its history. This was a time when it could focus on restoring its historic buildings and build a new, more optimistic city.

In 1991, the city rose to prominence when it staged the European Summit and gave its name to a European Treaty. Today, Maastricht is a city that has something for everyone - a centre of learning, a place where manufacturing is still as strong as ever, and somewhere for visitors to enjoy a day out shopping.


Kyk die video: Assemblée nationale Philippe Séguin 5 mai 1992 Traité de Maastricht (Februarie 2023).

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