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Wat het die keerpunt in die Honderdjarige Oorlog veroorsaak?

Wat het die keerpunt in die Honderdjarige Oorlog veroorsaak?


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Op skool het ek geleer dat die Engelse die oorhand in die oorlog gehad het totdat Joan van Arc die Franse koning oortuig het om 'n leër onder haar bevel te gee om Orléans te beleër en sedertdien het die Franse hul vyande gedwing om terug te trek na Calais.

Hoe het 'n ongeletterde meisie sonder militêre ervaring dit volgens die moderne oogpunt gedoen? Wat is haar betekenis?


Joan of Arc

Of liewer, God. Voor haar aankoms op die toneel het dit vir Engels en Frans gelyk asof God aan Engeland se kant was. Haar bydrae tot die opheffing van die beleg van Orleans gee hoop vir die Dauphinistiese saak, en vir 'n rukkie 'n oortuiging dat God aan hulle kant was. Die nadruklike oorwinning by Patay en die kroning van Karel VII versterk hierdie siening verder. Desmond Seward het geskryf dat:

Dit is onmoontlik om te weet of Joan se inspirasie beperk was tot 'n klein groepie hofsoldate, of as sy - soos die hedendaagse sosiale romantici sou wou dink - as 'n boer tot 'n ander met die staatsamptenaar gepraat het. Wat onmiskenbaar is, is dat baie Fransmanne vir 'n paar maande gedink het dat hulle 'n heilige oorlog voer, en die Engelse het angs vir die meisie en haar towerye geword.

En:

Die kroning van Karel VII, soos ons hom nou moet noem, het wondere verrig vir die Dauphinistiese moreel; volgens Monstrelet, 'n Bourgondiër: 'Die Franse het geglo dat God teen die Engelse was.'

Terwyl sy die Franse gemoed opgewek het en dit op sy beurt die Engelse opmars vertraag het, het sy nie dadelik die fortuin na die Franse gerig nie. Na haar gevangenskap en teregstelling in 1431, is baie van die winste wat in haar tyd behaal is, omgekeer, sodat Henry VI in Parys gekroon kon word.

Bourgondië

Die magstryd tussen die Bourgondiërs en Armagnacs het Frankryk gedurende die grootste deel van die vroeë 15de eeu intern verswak. Hulle wedywering was wat Henry V in staat gestel het om groot winste te behaal op sy tweede veldtog. Bourgondië was ook belangrik vir Engeland in terme van die militêre ondersteuning wat dit kon bied. 'N Aantal dinge het die alliansie deur die jare getoets. Anne, suster van die hertog van Bourgondië en vrou van die Engelse regent Duke of Bedford, het 'n groot rol gespeel om die alliansie bymekaar te hou deur haar verhoudings met sy twee voorste mans, so haar dood in 1432 was 'n slag vir die alliansie, wat nog vererger deur die daaropvolgende hertrou van Bedford, wat Boergondië ontwrig het weens sy spoed en omdat hy nie geraadpleeg is nie, aangesien die nuwe vrou sy vasaal was. Soos met enige bondgenoot het Bourgondië ook verwag om vir sy dade betaal te word, en hy het geskryf om te kla na die mislukte beleg van Compiègne toe sy betalings twee maande agterstallig was en hy die koste van sy artillerie moes dra toe Engelse betalings kom nie.

Met verloop van tyd het Bourgondië van Engeland weggedraai en na versoening met Karel VII. In 1431 kondig hy 'n 6 -jaarwapenstilstand aan. In 1435, omstreeks die tyd van Bedford se dood, maak hy vrede met Charles VII in die Verdrag van Arras. Die verlies van die Bourgondiese mannekrag en die bevryding van Franse magte wat voorheen teen Bourgondië opgestel was, het die taak van die Engelse aansienlik moeiliker gemaak. Hulle het ook 'n groot deel van hul steun in sommige van hul besette gebiede te danke gehad aan die Bourgondiese invloed, en sodra Bourgondië van trou verander het, het die mense van hierdie streke dit ook gedoen. In 1436 het Parys, onder Bourgondiese invloed, sy poorte oopgemaak vir die troepe van Karel VII.

Geld

Volgens Seward kan gebiede wat deur die Armagnacs beheer word, drie tot vyf keer die belastingbelasting as Frankryk beset het, hoewel dit nie effektief ingehaal is nie as gevolg van laks insameling en verduistering. Die wesenlike verskil was te wyte aan die verskillende vlakke van verwoesting in hierdie gebiede. Die Engelse mense het ook begin moeg word vir die oorlog wat hulle voortdurend gevra word om te finansier, en ekonomiese omstandighede het ook gelei tot 'n afname in belastinginkomste. In 1433 het Bedford se ondersoek na die finansies 'n algehele skuld getoon wat byna 3 jaar se inkomste bedra het. Ondanks sy sukses en gewildheid kon hy nie ekstra belasting verkry nie. Seward het geskryf dat:

Die landboudepressie en 'n afname in die buitelandse handel het die opbrengs van belasting verminder, en verminderde inkomste was 'n baie groter bedreiging vir die Lancastriese dubbele monargie as enige Jeanne d'Arc.

As gevolg hiervan sukkel Engeland om sy mans en bondgenote te betaal. Sommige soldate is vroeg terug huis toe en het belangrike vestings onderbemande gelaat. Ander wend hulle tot brigandage en verminder die plaaslike steun vir die Engelse saak. Die tekort aan geld het ook beteken dat dit moeilik was om leërs te finansier om plekke wat die Franse verloor het, terug te kry. Aangesien kardinaal Beaufort beide 'n belangrike politieke speler en 'n primêre bron van befondsing vir veldtogte was, het dit ook beteken dat finansiering soms gegee is aan oorsake wat meer polities as militêr van aard was. Dit was die rede waarom in 1443 die neef van Beaufort, die graaf van Somerset, toegelaat is om 'n toegeeflike en nuttelose ekspedisie te onderneem, onafhanklik van die bevel van luitenant-generaal hertog van York en teen sy advies dat die geld beter bestee kan word.

Gewilde ondersteuning

Terwyl die Engelse gewilde plaaslike steun vir die Engelse was terwyl hulle die Franse stoom, het dit geleidelik verdwyn as gevolg van 'n kombinasie van faktore. Een daarvan was die geleidelike onttrekking van die Bourgondiese steun. Weerprobleme het gelei tot 'n aansienlik verminderde oesopbrengs en voedseltekort, vererger deur Armagnac -aanvalle wat verhoed het dat lewering afgelewer word, waardeur baie ongelukkig was met hul Engelse heersers. Baie in Parys was ook ontsteld oor die parsimonium van Henry VI se kroning. Engelse woestyne het op brigandage gekom omdat hulle deur hul leër onbetaald gelaat is. Sommige, soos Richard Venables, het saamgespan met ander woestyne, hulle gevestig in vestings en terroriseer naburige dorpe. Die verlies aan volksondersteuning was beduidend omdat dit dorpe en stede moeilik kon hou. 'N Normandiese opstand in 1436 bedreig die veiligheid van Rouen en moet uiteindelik met geweld neergelê word. Parys self sou val toe die burgers van kant verander.


Engeland het die opkoms vir 'n lang tyd in Frankryk gehou, want dit het twee baie bekwame leiers in Henry V en die hertog van Bedford gehad in 'n tyd toe Frankryk deur interne struwelinge te kampe gehad het. Maar 'n suksesvolle beroep het baie faktore vereis om in hul guns voort te gaan. Ongeag die suksesse van Engeland op die slagveld, die Bourgondiese alliansie, die Franse onenigheid en veral die Engelse finansiële situasie kon nie vir ewig gehou word nie.

Bronne:

  • Die honderdjarige oorlog, Desmond Seward
  • Verowering, Juliet Barker

Daar was baie redes waarom die Engelse die oorlog van 100 jaar verloor het, met Joan of Arc een van hulle. Die belangrikste faktor vir hul sukses tot in die 1430's was Burgundy se betrokkenheid by die oorlog. Bourgondië was destyds 'n massiewe hertogdom onder die hof in Dijon en het 'n aansienlike deel van die Franse troepe vasgebind. Toe Bourgondië van kant verander, het die oorlog beslissend teen die guns van Engeland gegaan.

'N Tweede belangrike kwessie is die toenemende aanvaarding van die volle plaat en die gotiese plaatrusting deur die Franse adel. Hierdie pantseruitbreidings het die ridder ondeurdringbaar gemaak vir Longbows, wat 'n belangrike bydrae gelewer het tot die suksesse van Crecy (waar moderne toetse met 'n stuk gedeeltelike bord van die slagveld en 'n 100 lb -trekmasjien suksesvol deur die bord geskiet is - ek het ongelukkig die skakel verloor hiervoor, maar dit was 'n ontdekkingskanaal of geskiedeniskanaalprogram IIRC). Aangesien Engelse leërs destyds hoofsaaklik uit langboogmanne bestaan, ontken dit hul doeltreffendheid toenemend (daar moet op gelet word dat Agincourt deur LongbowMEN gewen is, nie Longbows nie).

Laastens het die volledig gedemoraliseerde Franse 'n groot saamtrek nodig gehad ná Agincourt. Orleans en Joan of Arc het dit verskaf.


Jean d'Arc het die strategiese situasie beter verstaan ​​as die adel, en het haar invloed saam met die gewone mense gebruik om die kwessie te dwing. Sy het besef dat aggressiewe oortreding aansienlike winste kan behaal, waar 'n versigtige en verdedigende konsentrasie van massamagte hulle hopeloos sou vertraag en meer sou verloor as wat dit verdedig.

Die kombinasie van aggressiewe oortreding en politieke mobilisering van die gewone mense en adel vir die Franse saak het die gety van die oorlog verander. Dit was die werk van 'n onvolwasse, ongeletterde meisie, wat sy laaste optrede as militêre bevelvoerder daarin geslaag het om haar hele gasheer te red met 'n buitengewoon goed uitgevoerde toevlugsoord te midde van oorweldigende opposisie. Verraad en ongeluk het beteken dat sy nie veilig by hulle kon aansluit nie.

Benewens haar slagveld en politieke genie, het die vrome en suiwer Jean d'Arc 'n paar regte bastards vir haar laat werk, en sy het hulle genadeloos losgelaat. (bv .: Bloubaard)


U vergeet die feit dat Joan nie beweer het dat sy op eie impuls opgetree het nie - maar dat sy engelvisies gehad het. In die Middeleeue, toe mense sulke dinge baie waardeer, was dit 'n sterk aanspraak op aandag en gesag. As moderne terme werklik nodig is, kan u sê dat sy 'n groot uitstraling het.

'N Ander belangrike punt is dat dit vir die Dauphin, wat Joan 'n weermag gegee het, 'n situasie sonder verlies was. As sy wen, neem hy die eer (soos in die werklike geskiedenis gebeur het). As sy verloor, is dit net ''n onvolwasse, ongeletterde meisie' wat die skuld gekry het. Standaard bestuurstrik.


'N Mislukte Missouri -woonbuurt 'n paar jaar later was die man wat die VSA gelei het in die kernuitwissing van twee groot Japannese stede.

Of dink aan 'n man wat naby die onderkant van sy klas by West Point geëindig het en uit dringendheid uit die weermag gedwing is, wat as 'n behoeftige saalverkoper bymekaargekom het. Vier jaar later het hy eers die Konfederale leërs wat die Mississippi in die weste bewaak het, verslaan, daarna hul leërs wat die hoofstad in die Ooste bewaak het, wat die bloedigste oorlog in die Amerikaanse geskiedenis effektief gewen het.

Dus sou ek nie so vinnig koue biografiese feite gebruik om die leierseienskappe van iemand wat u nog nooit ontmoet het nie, af te maak. In die regte situasie is sommige andersins baie gebrekkige mense tans die perfekte leier. In 'n groot genoeg groep sal sulke mense natuurlik bo uitkom.

En ja, dit is 'n bewese feit dat mans, selfs in minder verligte tye, 'n wyfie sou volg, as sy oor goeie leiersvermoëns beskik, en 'n rigting sou lei wat volgens hulle die regte een was. Kyk na die lewens van Boudica en Ching Shih vir voorbeelde.


Na die dood van Henry V (van Agincourt -bekendheid) in 1422, is Engeland tot 1461 (in naam) regeer deur Henry VI, wat tydens sy bewind onbevoeg sou wees as gevolg van minderheid, waansin, gevangenisstraf en abdikasie. Gedurende hierdie tydperk was die Engelse monargie nie in staat om sy aanspraak op die Franse troon, wat die grondslag van die Honderdjarige Oorlog was, af te dwing nie, en in werklikheid het die Hertogte van die koninkryk baie van Henry se koninkryk spandeer oor Engelse buit, sonder tyd of belangstelling in Franse.

Die afwyking van die Hertogte van Bourgondië van Engelse bondgenote tot Franse bondgenote word elders gelys as die keerpunt, maar ek sien dit as die gevolg en nie die oorsaak nie. Watter gesonde hertog van Bourgondië sou alleen staan ​​teen die Franse terwyl die Engelse so gefokus was op interne twis om nutteloos soos bondgenote te wees? Veel veiliger en produktiewer om kontinentale buit wat uit Engelse besittings met die Franse monargie geplunder is, te verdeel, as om die hertogdom in gevaar te stel deur alleen daarteen te staan.

Na die waansin van Henry Vi in 1453 en die gelyktydige vermindering van die Engelse kontinentale besit in Calais, breek die War of the Roses uit en word die Engelse adel vir 'n verdere generasie afgelei met die Engelse opvolging. Teen die einde van die konflik op Bosworth Field in 1485 het die Franse monargie daarin geslaag om die eerste werklike kontinentale nasiestaat te vorm, en Engelse aansprake op die Franse troon is tot absurditeit verminder.

Om terug te keer na die vraag - die keerpunt in die Honderdjarige Oorlog was die verlies van belangstelling (en vermoë) van die Engelse monargie om sy aanspraak op die Franse monargie af te dwing as gevolg van 'n lang tydperk van interne onstabiliteit tydens en na die dood van Henry V in 1422 wat tot 1485 geduur het.

Ja, al my skakels is na Wikipedia - maar dit is 'n ontledingsvraag en ek kan nie aan feite dink wat betwis word nie. Die vraag gaan eintlik oor hoe om die aanvaarde feite die beste te interpreteer om die begrip van onderliggende oorsake en onderlinge verhoudings te versterk.


Die keerpunt in die honderdjarige oorlog het plaasgevind toe Frankryk sy selfvertroue herwin het, grootliks te danke aan Joan of Arc.

Frankryk het 'n groter bevolking gehad en groter leërs as Engeland opgestel. Franse leërs is uitmanoeuvreer by beroemde gevegte soos Crecy, Poitiers en Agincourt. Maar behalwe vir die lang boog, was die Franse bewapening ook nie minderwaardig as die Engelse nie. Frankryk moes basies maneuvergevegte vermy en gevegte hand aan hand voer.

Joan se oorwinning in Orleans was 'n groot sielkundige oorwinning, aangesien Orleans die poort na die suide was. Die stryd is gewen omdat Joan die vereiste hand tot handgevegte gelei het, en daarna ander begin het, waaronder 'n optog na hReims, die plek waar die kroning van die Franse konings was.

Joan se onkunde was nie noodwendig 'n nadeel nie; en die feit dat sy 'n herder in die veld was, het moontlik die noodsaaklike gevegseienskappe vir haar gegee. Wat die Franse destyds nodig gehad het, was nie 'n strateeg nie, maar 'n 'bakleier', dink aan Ulysees S. Grant, wie se medebeamptes gekla het dat hy 'te veel whisky gedrink het'. President Lincoln se antwoord was: "Vind uit watter soort en stuur 'n vat na al die ander generaals."

Joan se "ongeletterdheid" was nie juis 'n nadeel nie, toe die Franse nodig was 'n leier wat die oorlog sou kon verdoof tot een wat die numeries superieure Franse 'van naby en persoonlik' kon beveg. (Die Engelse het die meeste van hul oorwinnings behaal deur beter maneuver in die oop veld.)

'N Jong herder met die naam David het 'n tweegeveg gewen teen 'n prominente krygsman met die naam Goliat en het sy land gelei in 'n suksesvolle oorlog teen die Filistyne van Goliat.


Die bevolking van Frankryk was ongeveer drie keer die van Engeland. Dit het beteken dat hoewel klein, maar doeltreffende Engelse leërs die Franse in gevegte kon verslaan - ten minste wanneer hulle op hul eie voorwaardes kon veg - hulle eenvoudig nie genoeg was om die oorlog te wen nie.

Politieke verdeeldheid tuis (die opwarmingsfase vir die rose-oorloë) was die laaste strooi.


'N Deel van die antwoord is dat die Franse tot 'n mate' fabain' -taktiek aangeneem het en in die algemeen opgehou het om die Engelse magte te beveg, maar hulle het geteister en geteister, maar groot veldslae vermy. Die Engelse magte van geleenthede marsjeer van regoor Frankryk (Calais na Bordeaux).

Ek het pas onlangs die opsomming van Jonathon "Divided Houses: The Hundred Years War III" gelees en beslis waar vir die tydperk wat hierdie boek dek, maar my algemene kennis van die oorlog en tydperk is nie groot nie.


Bladsye opsies

Historiese tradisie dateer uit die Honderdjarige Oorlog tussen Engeland en Frankryk tussen 1337 en 1453.

In 1337 het Edward III gereageer op die konfiskering van sy hertogdom van Aquitanië deur koning Philip VI van Frankryk deur Philip se reg op die Franse troon te betwis, terwyl die Engelse in 1453 die laaste van hul eens wye gebiede in Frankryk verloor het, na die nederlaag van John Talbot se Anglo-Gascon-leër by Castillon, naby Bordeaux.

Edward III het formeel die titel 'Koning van Frankryk en die Franse koninklike wapens' aangeneem.

Die oorsese besittings van die Engelse konings was die oorsaak van die spanning met die konings van Frankryk, en die spanning het tot 1066 bereik. Willem die Veroweraar was reeds hertog van Normandië toe hy koning van Engeland geword het. Sy agterkleinseun, Henry II, was by sy toetreding in 1154 reeds van Anjou afkomstig van erfenis van sy vader en hertog van Aquitaine (Gascogne en Poitou) regs van sy vrou Eleanor.

Hierdie besittings oor die kanaal het die konings van Engeland maklik die magtigste van die koning van Frankryk se vasale gemaak, en die onvermydelike wrywing tussen hulle het herhaaldelik tot oop vyandelikhede toegeneem. Die Honderdjarige Oorlog het ontstaan ​​uit hierdie vroeëre botsings en die gevolge daarvan.

Engeland se koning John het Normandië en Anjou in 1204 aan Frankryk verloor. Sy seun, Henry III, het in 1259 afstand gedoen van sy aanspraak op die lande in die Verdrag van Parys, maar dit het hom by Gaskonie gelaat as 'n hertogdom onder die Franse kroon. Die Engelse konings se hertoglike regte daar was steeds 'n bron van onrus, en oorloë het in 1294 en 1324 uitgebreek.

Die uitbraak van 1294 val saam met Edward l se eerste botsing met die Skotte, en daarna was die Franse en Skotte bondgenoot in alle daaropvolgende konfrontasies met Engeland. Dit was inderdaad die Franse steun vir David Bruce van Skotland, in die lig van Edward III se ingryping daar, wat die ondergang tussen Engeland en Frankryk veroorsaak het en uitloop op Philip VI se konfiskering van Aquitaine in 1337 - die gebeurtenis wat die honderdjarige oorlog tot gevolg gehad het.

Edward se riposte van 1337 - wat Philip se reg op die Franse troon uitdaag - stel 'n nuwe kwessie bekend wat hierdie oorlog van vorige konfrontasies onderskei het. In 1328 sterf Karel IV van Frankryk sonder 'n manlike erfgenaam. 'N Aanspraak op die opvolging is gemaak vir Edward, toe 15 jaar oud, deur die reg van sy moeder Isabella, dogter van Philip IV en Charles IV se suster. Maar hy is verbygegaan ten gunste van Philip, die seun van Philip IV se jonger broer, Charles van Valois.

Edward herleef nou sy aanspraak en aanvaar in 1340 formeel die titel 'Koning van Frankryk en die Franse koninklike wapens'. Geskiedkundiges redeneer of Edward werklik geglo het dat hy werklik die Franse troon sou bereik. Ongeag, sy eis het hom 'n baie belangrike hefboom in sy omgang met Philip gegee.

Hy kan dit gebruik om probleme op te wek deur Franse wanbestandheid aan te moedig om hom as koning te erken in plaas van Philip. Hy kan dit ook as 'n kragtige onderhandelingswapen gebruik deur aan te bied om afstand te doen van sy aanspraak op baie groot territoriale toegewings, byvoorbeeld die onafhanklikheid van Aquitaine uit Frankryk - moontlik selfs die sessie van Normandië en Anjou op dieselfde voorwaardes.


Watter honderdjarige oorlog?

Deur die idee van 'n deurlopende Anglo-Franse Middeleeuse oorlog uit te daag, onthul Ian Mortimer die merkwaardige kompleksiteite van 'n reeks verskillende konflikte wat begin het met 'n profesie en eindig met 'n Engelse dinastie wat die goedkeuring van God soek.

Almal weet dat die Honderdjarige Oorlog 'n uitgerekte reeks konflikte tussen Engeland en Frankryk was wat in die 14de en 15de eeu plaasgevind het. Dit word gekenmerk deur die aanspraak van die konings van Engeland om ook konings van Frankryk te wees deur die erfreg deur Isabella van Frankryk (c. 1296-1358), die moeder van Edward III (r. 1327-77) en die laaste oorlewende kind van Philip the Fair (r. 1285-1314). Maar alhoewel so 'n beskrywing genoeg kan wees vir 'n ensiklopedie, is dit vol probleme. Wat het die protagoniste gesoek?

Om voort te gaan met die lees van hierdie artikel, moet u toegang tot die aanlyn -argief verkry.

As u reeds toegang gekoop het, of as u 'n druk- en argief -intekenaar is, moet u dit verseker aangemeld.


Rite wat onluste veroorsaak het: die viering van 100 jaar van The Rite of Spring

Die gehoor, wat in die pas geopende Théâtre des Champs-Élysées ingepak was tot by die staanplek, het nog nooit so iets gesien of gehoor nie.

Soos die eerste klanke van die orkeswerk The Rite of Spring-Le Sacre du Printemps-deur die jong, weinig bekende Russiese komponis Igor Stravinsky klink, was daar 'n onrus in die gehoor. Volgens sommige van die aanwesiges - wat Marcel Proust, Pablo Picasso, Gertrude Stein, Maurice Ravel en Claude Debussy insluit - was die geluid van bespotlike lag.

Teen die tyd dat die gordyn opstaan ​​om te wys dat balletdansers die verhoog stamp, het die betogings 'n crescendo bereik. Die orkes en dansers, gechoreografeer deur die legendariese Vaslav Nijinsky, het voortgegaan, maar dit was onmoontlik om die musiek te hoor bo wat Stravinsky beskryf as 'n 'geweldige herrie'.

Terwyl 'n oproer verseker is, val twee faksies in die gehoor mekaar aan, daarna die orkes, wat onder 'n hael groente en ander voorwerpe aanhou speel het. Veertig mense is met geweld geslinger.

Die resensies was genadeloos. "Die werk van 'n mal ... pure kakofonie," skryf die komponis Puccini. "'N moeisame en barbaarse barbaarsheid," het Henri Quittard, kritikus van Le Figaro, bygevoeg.

Dit was 29 Mei 1913. Klassieke musiek sou nooit weer dieselfde wees nie.

Woensdagaand in dieselfde teater in Parys, sal 'n 21ste-eeuse gehoor-hopelik sonder groente-die Théâtre des Champs-Élysées vul vir 'n rekonstruksie van die oorspronklike opvoering ter viering van die 100ste herdenking van die berugte première. Dit word gevolg deur 'n nuwe weergawe van The Rite van die Berlynse choreograaf Sasha Waltz, onder 'n reeks herdenkingsopvoerings.

Vandag het die stuk van oproer tot opspraakwekkende resensies gegaan en word dit algemeen beskou as een van die invloedrykste musiekwerke van die 20ste eeu.

"Dit verberg 'n ou krag, dit is asof dit gevul is met die krag van die aarde," het Waltz gesê oor die musiek van Stravinsky.

Die Finse komponis en dirigent Esa-Pekka Salonen, tans hoofdirigent en artistieke adviseur van die Philharmonia-orkes in Londen, wat Donderdag die Rite of Spring by die Royal Feestsaal en in die Théâtre des Champs-Élysées sal uitvoer, het The Rite gesê het nog steeds sy ruggraat laat tintel. "Ek moet erken dat as ek by die oomblik kom net voor die laaste dans, my bloeddruk styg. Ek het 'n soort adrenalienstoot," het hy aan Reuters gesê.

"Dit is 'n ou grotman -reaksie."

Salonen het bygevoeg: "Die wonder van die stuk is die ewige jeug daarvan. Dit is so vars dat dit nog steeds 'n gat skop."

Daar is nog steeds verwarring en meningsverskil oor die gebeure daardie nag in 1913, wat die teater beskryf as 'een van die grootste skandale in die geskiedenis van musiek' en die The Rite in die 'grondslag van alle moderne musiek' verander.

Stravinsky, was feitlik onbekend voordat Sergei Diaghilev hom aangestel het om te komponeer vir sy Ballets Russes se Paryseisoen van 1913. Sy eerste twee werke, The Firebird, wat in 1910 opgevoer is, en Petrushka, in 1911, is algemeen bekroon. The Rite, met die ondertitel "Pictures of Pagan Russia in Two Parts", begin met primitiewe rituele wat die lente vier, en eindig met 'n jong offeroffer wat haarself doodmaak.

Die teatersaal was nie net die aand in 1913 volgepak nie, maar die trappe en gange was vol van opgewonde en verwarrende toeskouers.

The Rite is geopen met 'n inleidende melodie aangepas uit 'n Litause volkslied, met 'n fagot wat ongewoon bo-aan die register verskyn, en die komponis Camille Saint-Saëns laat uitroep: 'As dit 'n fagot is, dan is ek 'n bobbejaan ! " Die swaar, stampende treë was 'n wêreld weg van die elegansie van tradisionele ballet, terwyl die dansers die wrede intrige uitgevaardig het.

Toe die gehoor uitbars, roep Diaghilev tot kalmte en flits die huis se ligte aan en af, terwyl Nijinsky noodgedwonge trappe na die dansers moet uitroep terwyl die maat van die musiek deur die oproerige kakofonie verdrink word. Selfs nou word daar gedebatteer oor die vraag of die reaksie van die publiek spontaan was of die werk van ontstoke tradisionaliste gewapen met groente wat moeilikheid kom soek het.

Die onstuimige première is gevolg deur nog vyf betreklik vreedsame optredes voor een vertoning in Londen, wat gemengde resensies gekry het, maar die volledige ballet- en orkeswerk is slegs sewe keer uitgevoer voor die uitbreek van die eerste wêreldoorlog.

Nadat die geveg geëindig het, het Diaghilev probeer om The Rite of Spring te laat herleef, maar niemand het die choreografie onthou nie. Teen daardie tyd was Nijinsky, die grootste danser van sy generasie, besig om geestelik agteruit te gaan.

Sedertdien is The Rite aangepas vir en ingesluit in ongeveer 150 produksies regoor die wêreld, waaronder gangsterfilms, 'n punk -rock -interpretasie, 'n nagmerrievisie van Aboriginal Australia deur Kenneth MacMillan, en Walt Disney se film Fantasia uit die veertigerjare. 'N Gedenkvertoning is in die Royal Albert Hall in Londen opgevoer ter viering van die 50ste herdenking van die première.

Ter viering van hierdie jaar se honderdjarige bestaan ​​van The Rite of Spring, wat deur Leonard Bernstein beskryf word as die belangrikste musiekstuk van die 20ste eeu, het beide Sony en Universal bokssette uitgereik met die beste weergawes in hul agterste katalogusse.


Betekenis van die Honderdjarige Oorlog

Die Honderdjarige Oorlog, begin met die voorwendsel van 'n Engelse aanspraak op die Franse troon, is later hernu en bestendig in 'n poging om in werklikheid Henry V se grootse opvatting van 'n tweeledige monargie te bepaal waarmee die Engelse koning twee koninkryke oor beide kant van die kanaal. Dit het egter getoon dat die Engelse gesag nie in 'n vyandige Frankryk effektief kon word nie en dat die Franse nie sterk genoeg was om die Engelse konings die volkome dwaasheid en onuitvoerbaarheid van hul pretensies te laat erken nie. Trouens, gedurende die 14de en 15de eeu, agter die gevel van aansprake en teenaansprake, agter die gevegte en politieke maneuvers, is twee nasies gesmee wie se natuurlike ontwikkeling en naasmekaarstelling tot oorlogvoering sou lei.

Die aanvanklike aanspraak op die Franse troon kan slegs verklaar word deur die sterk bande van Edward III met Frankryk en deur 'n gevoel vir sy Kapenaars, net so sterk soos sy duidelike trots op sy Engelse koninkryk. Teen die 15de eeu was hierdie gevoel egter feitlik dood by die konings uit Lancastria en York wat Charles VII en Louis XI uitgedaag het. Gedurende die voorafgaande drie of vier generasies het die Engelse smaak gekry vir winsgewende ekspedisies na die vasteland, waaruit hulle altyd gehoop het om terug te keer belaai met buit en met gevangenes vir losprys, sodat Frankryk verwoes en vermors was soos toe die Vikings en Noordmanne het toegeslaan op die Karolingiese ryk. Die Franse was blykbaar nie in staat om hierdie toedrag van sake op te los nie, maar het eerder probeer om hul lyding te verlig deur die monargie te hervorm - 'n hervorming wat na die Parys -rewolusie van 1356–58 van krag geword het in die bewind van Johannes II en Charles V. Die verswakking van die monargie deur die minderheid en die kranksinnigheid van Charles VI het die hebsug van die prinse en gunsteling predikante ongebreideld gelaat en die land prooi vir afpersing. Die weersin van die publiek oor hierdie misbruik word al hoe meer gereeld uitgedruk, met steeds groter geweld, maar met minder en minder effek.

Die 14de en 15de eeu was 'n lang stryd om mag tussen die kroon, die adel en verskillende hervormingselemente, sowel in Frankryk as in Engeland. Ooreenkomste in politieke en grondwetlike ontwikkeling en die algemene ervaring van sosiale omwenteling het heel moontlik tot alliansies tussen parallelle partye aan weerskante van die Kanaal gelei. Terwyl dit gebeur het, toe die een groep in Frankryk opklim, het die ander gereeld in Engeland regeer, sodat hulle soortgelyke ervarings hulle nie bitterlik verdeel het nie. Nasionale bewussyn, gebore en gekoester in die lang stryd, het uiteindelik so sterk geword dat enige projek van vereniging - selfs 'n bloot persoonlike vereniging van die krone soos voorgestel deur Henry V - tot mislukking gedoem is. Die voor die hand liggendste resultaat van die Honderdjarige Oorlog was om sowel Frankryk as Engeland vasbeslote te maak om die herlewing van so 'n stryd, waarin beide partye hul mannekrag en hulpbronne totaal en al vermors het, te vermy. In beide lande het heersers en die bevolking hulself ywerig gewend na ander projekte.

Die redakteurs van Encyclopaedia Britannica Hierdie artikel is onlangs hersien en bygewerk deur Adam Augustyn, besturende redakteur, verwysingsinhoud.


Die Balkanoorloë: 100 jaar later, 'n geskiedenis van geweld

Soldate verwyder die dooies van die slagveld by Adrianopel tydens die Eerste Balkanoorlog.

'N Eeu gelede begin die Balkanoorloë. Op 8 Oktober 1912 het die klein Koninkryk Montenegro oorlog verklaar teen die swak Ottomaanse Ryk, met 'n inval in Albanië, toe onder die nominale Turkse bewind. Drie ander Balkanstate wat in samewerking met die Montenegryne was - Bulgarye, Griekeland en Serwië - het vinnig die voorbeeld gevolg en oorlog gevoer teen die ou keiserlike vyand terwyl hulle 'n bron van nasionale sentiment in elk van hul tuislande getref het. Teen Maart 1913 het hul bloed deurdrenkte veldtogte die verswakte Ottomane effektief uit Europa gedryf. Maar teen Julie sou Griekeland en Serwië bots met Bulgarye in die sogenaamde Tweede Balkanoorlog - 'n bittere stryd wat maande lank verander het, hoe meer gebiede van hande verander, meer dorpe verwoes en meer liggame op die aarde gestort word.

Die vrede wat gevolg het, was glad nie vrede nie. 'N Jaar later, met die groot magte van Europa verstrengel in die lot van die Balkan, het 'n Joegoslaviese nasionalis in die Bosniese stad Sarajevo die kroonprins van die Oostenryk-Hongaarse Ryk vermoor. Europa het in die Eerste Wêreldoorlog gedompel

Die Balkan, 'sê een van die vele wyshede wat aan Winston Churchill toegeskryf word,' genereer meer geskiedenis as wat dit plaaslik kan verbruik. ' Vir Churchill en baie Westerse waarnemers van sy era was hierdie ruwe stuk van Suidoos -Europa 'n hoofpyn, 'n geopolitieke gemors wat eeue lank op die kruispad van ryke en godsdienste was, deur etniese stamme en bemoeienis met magte van buite. 'N Halfeeu vroeër het die Pruisiese kanselier Otto von Bismarck - die argitek van die moderne Duitse staat - sy afsku uitgespreek oor hierdie oorlas van 'n streek en bespot dat die hele Balkan "nie die bene werd was van een Pommere grenadier" in diens. .

Terwyl hierdie groot staatsmanne van die Weste 'n agtergeblewen land vol antieke haat sien, het die onstuimige verlede van die Balkan, en veral die nalatenskap van die Balkanoorloë, 'n meer leersame geskiedenisles vir ons hede as selfs die Eerste Wêreldoorlog. Dit is nie net omdat die Balkanoorloë 'n paar historiese eerstes op die slagveld veroorsaak het nie - soos die eerste keer toe vliegtuie gebruik is om 'n vyand aan te val (deur die Bulgare) of 'n paar van die eerste grusame tonele van loopgraafoorlogvoering op die vasteland van Europa (waarnemers vertel hoe , in een loopgraaf, het die bene van dooie Turkse soldate in die grond gevries en daar moes afgekap word). Dit is omdat hierdie gevegte wat 'n eeu gelede gevoer is, op baie maniere ons huidige wêreld weerspieël: een waar onderlinge en sektariese konflikte - byvoorbeeld Sirië of die Demokratiese Republiek van die Kongo - in die agendas van buite -magte vasgevang is en waar die trauma van daardie geweld dui dikwels meer op dieselfde.

Op die oppervlak was die Balkanoorloë opportunistiese grondgrype. Die Ottomaanse Ryk, op hierdie stadium baie "die siek man van Europa", het sedert die 15de eeu heerskappy oor 'n groot deel van die gebied gehad, maar teen die 19de eeu was dit 'n bestendige bloedinggebied. Newly independent states in Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia — at times, egged on, at others, reined in by imperial powers like Russia, Austria-Hungary, Germany and the U.K., who were all jockeying for supremacy— were now possessed by their own fantasies of creating a Greater Serbia or Greater Bulgaria. The genie of ethnic nationalism was very much out of its bottle, and the Balkans were suffused with anti-Turkish, anti-Muslim feeling. See these popular lines of doggerel, penned by a mid-19th century Montenegrin prince:

So tear down minarets and mosques,

and the kindle the Serbian yule logs,

and let us paint our Easter eggs …

… our faiths will be submerged in blood.

The better of the two will be rise redeemed.

[Eid] can never live in peace

with Christmas Day.

And there was blood. The joint Balkan invasion of Turkish territory in Albania, Macedonia and Thrace, along the rim of the Aegean Sea, saw brutal, bitter fighting, miserable sieges and myriad atrocities committed on all sides. A Czech correspondent described the approach to Lozengrad, the Bulgarian name for what’s now Kirklareli, Turkey, as something out of Dante’s Inferno. “Only his dark genius could recreate all the horrors of the cold swamps out of which stick the twisted and mutilated bodies of the fallen,” he wrote in the Czech daily Pravo Lidu in October 1912. Another journalist entering the city of Adrianople (now Edirne, Turkey) when it was finally surrendered by the Ottomans to the Bulgarians in March 1913, recounted the utter desolation of the ancient town, then a “ghastly theater of blood”: “Everywhere bodies reduced to mere bones, blue hands ripped from forearms, the bizarre gestures, empty eye-sockets, open mouths as if calling in desperation, the shattered teeth behind the torn and blackened lips.”

The capture of Adrianople effectively brought what’s considered the First Balkan War to a close. A treaty brokered in London by Europe’s great powers ended hostilities by May, but would soon unravel when, in late June, territorial disputes led to the Greeks and Serbs turning on the Bulgarians — the biggest victors of the First Balkan War — and, even at times with the help of Turkish fighters, stripping the Bulgarians of much of the gains they had made in the earlier conflict. It was a huge source of national humiliation for the Bulgarians, who had mobilized 500,000 troops — a quarter of their entire male population — during the wars.

In all, over the course of the Balkan wars, some 200,000 soldiers died in less than a year with countless numbers of civilians massacred in raids on towns or laid low by starvation and disease. Grisly accounts followed one after the other of pogroms and ethnic cleansing in a dizzyingly complex, diverse part of the world that, for all the inefficiencies and injustices of Ottoman rule, had existed in relative multicultural harmony for centuries. A landmark report on the Balkan wars, issued in 1913 by the then brand new Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, D.C., claimed that “there is no clause in international law applicable to land war and to the treatment of the wounded, which was not violated … by all the belligerents.” The Carnegie report went on to declaim “the megalomania of the national ideal” — the ugly, crude nationalism that fired the expansionist zeal of countries the world over. “Violence carries its own punishment with it and something very different from armed force will be needed to establish order and peace in the Balkans,” the report warns.

But that was a message, like many others made then by dovish liberals and peaceniks, that went unheeded. At a time when the great powers were steadily amassing arms and tying themselves into alliances primed for war, the smaller Balkan states could only end up pawns in a much bigger game of chess. Resurgent Serbian nationalism, backed by Russia, put the two ultimately at odds with Austria-Hungary, triggering World War I. “The Balkans were not the powder keg, as is so often believed: the metaphor is inaccurate,” writes journalist and Balkans historian Misha Glenny, in his book, The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, 1804-1999. “They were merely the powder trail that the great powers themselves had laid. The powder keg was Europe.”

What followed, of course, involved more bloodshed, more seismic upheavals, more redrawing of maps. Decades later, the Balkans tragically convulsed in another round of ethnic warfare following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of Yugoslavia’s own communist state. As some commentators parroted Churchill and Bismarck’s dismay with the region, Mark Mazower, a noted scholar of Eastern Europe now at Columbia University, wrote in an essay how the fragile politics of a nation — not simply old ethnic enmities — can lead to the disintegration of once tolerant, integrated societies: “It has been war — first as a specter then as a reality — which affected people’s sense of ethnic identity.”

Looking at the vicious sectarian fighting taking place now in Syria, one wonders what sort of country can possibly emerge when the shooting stops. The hideous excesses 0f an authoritarian regime, the cash and weaponry supplied to rebels by foreign powers and the unraveling of the delicate political consensus that once existed has led to a grinding, miserable civil war with no end in sight.

Prescient for its time, the 1913 Carnegie report opens with an impassioned appeal for peace and an end to the “monstrous business” of the arms race. Otherwise, the legacy of the Balkan wars was clear:

[It will be] only the beginning of other wars, or rather of a continuous war, the worst of all, a war of religion, of reprisals, of race, a war of one people against another, of man against man and brother against brother. It has become a competition, as to who can best dispossess and “denationalize” his neighbor.

Violence, as the report says, is its own punishment. And a century doesn’t seem so long ago.


7 facts about the Hundred Years’ War

The Hundred Years’ War (1337–1453) was a series of conflicts fought between England and France over succession to the French throne. It lasted 116 years and saw many major battles – from the battle of Crécy in 1346 to the battle of Agincourt in 1415, which was a major English victory over the French. Here are seven facts about the long-running struggle…

Hierdie kompetisie is nou gesluit

Published: July 17, 2018 at 11:47 am

When Charles IV of France died without a son in 1328, Charles’s first cousin was chosen to succeed, becoming King Philip VI. Yet Edward III of England, as the deceased king’s nearest male relation, was considered by some to have the stronger claim. When Phillip VI confiscated the duchy of Aquitaine from England in 1337, Edward III responded by pressing his claim to the French throne, beginning the Hundred Years’ War. The conflict saw major developments in military strategy and technology and the final French victory at Castillon in 1453 was the first major field engagement of the war to be decided by gunfire. Here, historian David Green, author of The Hundred Years War: A People’s History, shares seven lesser-known facts about the series of conflicts…

A Hundred Years’ War?

The first thing anyone usually learns about the Hundred Years’ War is that it did not last 100 years. Tradition dates it from 1337 to 1453, but in some ways it is more helpful to view this longest of European wars as one phase of an even longer struggle between England and France, stretching perhaps from the Norman Conquest of 1066 until the 1904 Entente Cordiale [a series of agreements signed between Great Britain and France that marked the end of hundreds of years of intermittent conflict between the two states.]

Conflict with the ‘ancient enemy’ has shaped the identities of both countries, and memories of the war remain long on both sides of the Channel. Charles de Gaulle remarked in June 1962: “Our greatest hereditary enemy was not Germany, it was England. From the Hundred Years’ War to Fashoda, she hardly ceased to struggle against us… she is not naturally inclined to wish us well.”

V for Victory?

The legend that the origins of the ‘v’ sign can be found in the Hundred Years’ War is, sadly, just legendary. There are no contemporary sources that suggest English archers, as an insult, raised to the French the two fingers with which they drew their longbows, nor that the French dismembered captured archers – removing those same fingers and thus preventing them from ever firing a bow again.

There is, however, an account of the French ‘mooning’ a detachment of English troops during the campaign that led to the battle of Crécy. This so enraged the English that they launched an ill-advised attack on a well-defended position and were beaten back with heavy losses.

Total war?

We are often told that ‘total war’ is a sad product of the modern, industrial age. It is, however, difficult to find any section of English or French society that was not affected by the Hundred Years’ War.

The peasantry in both countries, for example, were central to the war effort and suffered greatly as a consequence. Indeed, its members were targeted directly: because of the connection between taxation (paid chiefly by the peasantry) and military defence, the status of ‘non-combatants’ became very uncertain during the war. So, by attacking taxpayers, the English also attacked French military resources.

Furthermore, as the war unfolded it became a consciously ‘national’ struggle and, consequently, there were few reasons non-combatants should be immune from its effects. This policy and its brutally sophisticated implementation are clear from a letter written in 1355 by Sir John Wingfield, who served in the retinue of Edward the Black Prince (1330–76):

It seems certain that since the war against the French king began, there has never been such destruction in a region as in this raid. For the countryside and towns which have been destroyed… produced more revenue for the king of France in aid of his war than half his kingdom… as I could prove from authentic documents found in various towns in the tax-collectors’ houses.

Wingfield served as ‘governor of the prince’s business’ (essentially his business manager), and he wrote in the aftermath of the so-called grande chevauchée (a raid across southern France in which an army of around 6,000 soldiers destroyed 500 settlements of various sorts – villages, castles, towns, hamlets – and may have devastated up to 18,000 square kilometres of territory).

The Black Prince, however, was not content merely to orchestrate and witness the destruction, he wished to determine its exact extent, and so he brought officials such as Wingfield with him to calculate the precise cost to the French treasury. The psychological cost of this sort of raiding – the fear and insecurity it surely engendered – is more difficult to measure, but as the war drew on in France the ringing of church bells might as easily mean an impending raid as a call to prayer.

Rituals at the battle of Agincourt

The battle of Agincourt began at about 11am on 25 October 1415 (the feast day of Saints Crispin and Crispian). It had not been a pleasant night: heavy rain had turned the ploughed field between the two armies into something approaching a quagmire. The English and French forces had deployed in the cold before dawn, and hours had passed without either side making any move. Finally, King Henry V (r1413–22) ordered an advance.

But before they moved forward, a fascinating and seemingly extraordinary act took place: each man knelt – archers and men-at-arms alike – kissed the ground, and took a little earth in his mouth. This collective and yet deeply personal ritual seems to have been sacramental a ceremony that combined elements of the Eucharist with the burial service. It served as a blessing, a purification, and a preparation for death.

Throughout the Anglo-French war, battles had enormous religious and symbolic significance. Not only was victory or defeat an indication of divine judgement, but for many it might bring one decidedly closer to divine judgement of a very personal nature.

We few, we happy few: part one

While chronicle accounts allow us to reconstruct the narrative of the battle of Agincourt with some precision, the size of the opposing forces remains a matter of contention. Shakespeare would have us believe that in 1415 the English were outnumbered at least 10-to-one. Such a number was shaped by dramatic necessity and also by various contemporary and near-contemporary English sources that suggested the French army totalled between 60,000 and 160,000 men.

Such numbers are patently absurd given what we know of the possibilities of military recruitment at this time they were grossly inflated with the aim of exaggerating the scale of Henry’s victory. Recent work makes it clear that the Valois army was considerably more modest in size, perhaps 20,000–30,000 troops. And, indeed, in her 2005 account of the battle, Anne Curry argues that the French army was smaller still, numbering no more than 12,000 soldiers.

By comparison, Henry commanded between 6,000 and 9,000 soldiers – the anonymous author of the Gesta Henrici Quinti (The Deeds of Henry V), who witnessed the battle, suggested he led 5,000 archers and around 1,000 men-at-arms (although the numbering is not precise). The French, therefore, outnumbered the English by two to one, but probably no more.

We few, we happy few: part two

Some other aspects of Shakespeare’s account of the battle closely accord with contemporary accounts, and there is good reason to believe them to be accurate. When Sir Walter Hungerford (1378–1449) bemoaned the lack of archers in his company, Henry is said (again by the author of the Gesta Henrici Quinti) to have reprimanded him in a speech remarkably similar to that familiar from Shakespeare: “That is a foolish way to talk”, the king said, “because by God in Heaven… I would not, even if I could, have a single man more than I do. For these I have here with me are God’s people… Do you not believe that the Almighty, with these His humble few, is able to overcome the opposing arrogance of the French”.

Guns and gunpowder

The Hundred Years’ War saw some major developments in military strategy and technology. Indeed, some historians have argued that these changes amount to a ‘military revolution’.

Among such developments, the evolution of gunpowder weaponry was particularly significant. That evolutionary process was, however, a slow one. At Agincourt, for example, it appears that French artillery accounted for a solitary English archer during the battle, and in 1431 Philip the Good, duke of Burgundy, fired 412 cannonballs into the town of Lagny and succeeded only in killing a chicken.

Nonetheless, as the war entered its final phase such weapons were becoming increasingly effective. They played important roles in a number of Joan of Arc’s battles and sieges, and the ‘Maid’ was considered particularly adept in aiming the weapons. Then, in the late 1430s, Charles VII (1422–61) took steps to put in place a professional artillery train under the command of the Bureau brothers – John, the king’s Master Gunner, and his brother, Gaspard.

Thereafter, the weapons available to the French grew in number and efficiency, and they proved their worth in successive sieges. Gunpowder weapons allowed the French to eject the English from Normandy and Gascony with astonishing speed. In 1437, the castle of Castelnau-de-Cernès in Gascony was “broken down… by cannon and engines, and a great part of the walls were thrown to the ground”. In some cases, as at Bourg in 1451, the mere presence of guns was sufficient to bring about an immediate surrender.

Around this time, gunpowder weapons also began to be used effectively as field artillery. Formigny in 1450 (a decisive victory for the French) may have been the first battle decided by gunpowder artillery. The engagement began with a cavalry assault on the English infantry and longbowmen, which was repulsed. Soon afterwards, however, the Bureau brothers arrived with two breechloading culverins on wheeled carriages.

These were capable of a high rate of fire and could outdistance the English archers. Although it required the arrival of further reinforcements to decide the battle, the artillery clearly played a telling role.

This was also the case at Castillon in 1453 (a decisive French victory), the final engagement of the Hundred Years’ War. This was, undoubtedly, determined by artillery, and, as a consequence, the battle marks a deeply significant point in the history of European warfare.

David Green is senior lecturer in British studies at Harlaxton College and the author of The Hundred Years War: A People’s History (Yale University Press, 2014 paperback edition 2015).

This article was first published by History Extra in October 2015

Anne Curry will be speaking about ‘Henry V: A Life of Transformations’ at our Kings and Queens Weekend in March 2019. Find out more here


What caused the turning point in Hundred Years' War? - Geskiedenis

The Tet Offensive of 1968 proved to be the turning point of the Vietnam War and its effects were far-reaching. It changed the entire way that the United States approached the war: before the Tet Offensive the U.S. objective in Vietnam was to win the war after the Tet Offensive, the U.S. objective shifted toward finding a face-saving way to get out of Vietnam.

To understand fully the impact of the 1968 Tet Offensive, we must first go back to the previous year. By 1967, after more than two years of bitter fighting, the commitment of more than 400,000 troops, and steadily increasing casualty figures, many Americans believed that the war had degenerated into a bloody stalemate. At the same time, the anti-war movement was increasing in volume and intensity. Politically, President Johnson was under fire even within his own party for his handling of the war.

Given this situation, Johnson launched what became known as the “success offensive,” designed to convince the American people that the war was being won and that administration policies were succeeding. Administration spokesmen fanned out and began to spread the word. As part of this effort, the President brought home General William Westmoreland, senior US commander in Vietnam, in mid-November 1967 to make the administration’s case.

Westmoreland was glad to do so. By his primary metric—the body count—the US and allied forces were making significant headway against the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army on the battlefield, prevailing in every major battle and inflicting heavy casualties on the NVA and main force VC units. In a number of public and private venues, the general insisted that progress was being made in the war and that there was “a light at the end of the tunnel.” These words would come back to haunt him in a very short time.

Meanwhile, in Hanoi, even as Westmoreland spoke, the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party was finalizing preparations for a country-wide offensive designed to break the stalemate and ‘liberate’ South Vietnam.

The decision to launch the offensive was the result of a long-standing internal struggle over military strategy within the leadership in Hanoi. These struggles were principally over the timing involved in shifting from a protracted war toward a more decisive approach. In the end, however, the more cautious proponents of protracted war were overcome by those like General Nguyen Chi Thanh, commander in the South, who advocated a nationwide general offensive.

Ironically, Thanh died before the decision was made to launch the offensive and the responsibility for preparing the plan for the offensive fell to General Vo Nguyen Giap. The plan he came up with was designed to ignite a general uprising among the people of South Vietnam, shatter the South Vietnamese armed forces, and topple the Saigon regime, while at the same time increasing the level of pain for the Americans by inflicting more casualties on U.S. forces. At the very least, the decision-makers in Hanoi hoped to position themselves for any follow-on negotiations that might take place in the wake of the offensive.

The preparations for the offensive began in the summer months of 1967 the target date for launching the offensive was the beginning of Tet, the lunar New Year holiday, which would come at the end of January 1968.

During the second half of 1967, in what we would today call “shaping operations,” the Communists launched a number of attacks to draw US and allied attention away from the population centers, which would be the ultimate objectives for the 1968 offensive. As part of this effort, NVA forces engaged the Marines in a series of sharp battles in the hills surrounding Khe Sanh, a base in western Thua Thien Province, south of the DMZ up against the Laotian border. Further to the east, additional NVA forces besieged the Marine base at Con Thien just south of the Demilitarized Zone. Further south, Communist forces attacked Loc Ninh and Song Be, both in III Corps Tactical Zone, and in November they struck U.S. forces at Dak To in the Central Highlands. In purely tactical terms, these “border battles” as they became known, were costly failures for the Communists and they no doubt lost some of their best troops they sustained over 300 killed at Dak To alone. However, at the operational level, these battles achieved the intent of Giap’s plan by diverting General Westmoreland’s attention to the outlying areas away from the buildup around the urban target areas that would be struck during the Tet attacks.

US military intelligence analysts knew that the other side was planning some kind of large-scale attack in 1968, but they did not believe that it would come during Tet or that it would be countrywide. Still, there were many indicators that the enemy was planning something. When new intelligence poured in from all four Corps Tactical Zones, Westmoreland and his staff came to the conclusion that a major enemy effort was probable—all signs pointed to a new offensive. Still, most of the significant enemy activity had been along the DMZ and in the remote border areas.

In the words of one official in the Johnson White House, writing later in 1968, the Tet Offensive represented “the worst intelligence failure of the war.” Many historians and other observers have endeavored to understand how the Communists were able to achieve such a stunning level of surprise. There are a number of possible explanations, but there are two main reasons for the failure to predict what was coming. First, Allied estimates of enemy troop strengths and intentions were flawed. Part of the problem was that in the fall of 1967, Headquarters MACV in Saigon, in the face of vigorous disagreement from the Central Intelligence Agency, changed the way it calculated enemy order of battle—in terms of strength and organization for combat. At Westmoreland’s direction, the military analysts decided not to count the local militias of the National Liberation Front in the enemy order of battle, instantly reducing estimated enemy strength downward from 300,000 to 235,000. Almost overnight, this seemed to indicate that the war was going better than it was, but at the same time discounted a large number of potentially effective enemy fighters and support personnel. Having revised their enemy estimates, it appears that US military intelligence analysts then apparently accepted those estimates at face value—as ground truth—this is tantamount to what is known in some military circles as “drinking your own bath water.”

This caused Westmoreland and his analysts to discount any intelligence indicators that ran counter to the assessment that the enemy was getting weaker and, they reasoned, that any new offensive, because of this overall weakness, would be localized and limited. Thus, when incoming intelligence reports indicated that the enemy was planning a country-wide offensive, the reports were largely ignored.

The second major reason for the failure to predict the size and scope of the coming offensive was the focus on Khe Sanh. In late December 1967, signals intelligence indicated that there was a significant enemy build-up in the Khe Sanh area, site of the earlier “Hill Fights” in western Thua Thien Province. Westmoreland and his intelligence analysts decided that this build-up signified that the enemy’s main effort in 1968 would come at Khe Sanh. Therefore, Westmoreland, his headquarters, and the White House turned their focus on Khe Sanh and the northernmost provinces.

On 21 January, the North Vietnamese Army began the first large-scale shelling of Khe Sanh, which was followed by renewed heavy fighting in the hills surrounding the Marine base. These attacks seemed to confirm Westmoreland’s earlier assessment that the remote Marine base would be the focal point for any new Communist attack. He was sure that this was the opening salvo of the anticipated enemy offensive. The fact that the Khe Sanh situation looked hauntingly similar to that which the French had faced when they were decisively defeated at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 only added increased urgency to the events unfolding there.

Accordingly, Westmoreland ordered the commencement of Operation Niagara, a massive bombing campaign focused on suspected enemy positions around Khe Sanh. Additionally, he ordered the 1st Cavalry Division from the Central Highlands to Phu Bai just south of Hue and one brigade of the 101st Airborne Division to I Corps to strengthen the defenses of the northernmost provinces. By the end of January, more than half of all US combat maneuver battalions were in the I Corps area.

For the reasons just stated, when the Communists launched the Tet Offensive, they achieved almost total surprise. It could have been worse—due to a failure in coordination, a number of enemy attacks were launched prematurely in the Central Highlands and the adjacent coastal plains, during the early morning hours of 30 Jan—this was due to the fact that they were using a different lunar calendar than the main force, which was off by 24 hours. These premature attacks provided at least some warning for U.S. forces, but it was too late in most cases for the South Vietnamese forces, because most of the ARVN soldiers were home on leave and could not be recalled in time to stop what was to come the next night.

In the early morning hours of 31 January, the combined forces of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army, a total of over 84,000 troops, struck with a fury that was breathtaking in both its scope and suddenness. In attacks that ranged from the DMZ all the way south to the tip of the Ca Mau Peninsula, the NVA and VC struck 36 of South Vietnam’s 44 province capitals, 5 of its 6 largest cities, 71 of 242 district capitals, and virtually every allied airfield and key military installation in the country. One American general at the time said the situation map depicting the attacks “lit up like a pinball machine.”

In one of the most spectacular attacks, 19 VC sappers conducted a daring raid on the US Embassy in Saigon. Elsewhere in Saigon, VC units hit Tan Son Nhut Air Base, the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff headquarters, and a number of other key installations across the city. Some of the bitterest fighting was in Cholon, the Chinese section of Saigon.

Far to the north, 7500 VC and North Vietnamese soldiers overran and occupied Hue, the ancient imperial capital. Marines and ARVN soldiers had to be sent in to retake the city in almost a month of bitter house-to-house fighting.

The attacks of the Tet Offensive that raged up and down the length and breadth of South Vietnam were unprecedented in their magnitude and ferocity and the reports streaming in from Saigon portrayed the bitter fighting in near real-time on the evening news on the three TV networks.

CBS television news anchor Walter Cronkite, who had witnessed firsthand the bitter fighting at Hue, no doubt voiced the sentiment of many Americans when he exclaimed, “What the hell is going on?—I thought we were winning the war.” On 27 Feb, after returning from Vietnam, Cronkite went on the air, and declared the war a stalemate, and called for the U.S. to negotiate its way out of the war.

In truth, the Tet Offensive, as it unfolded during the next weeks and months, turned out to be a disaster for the Communists, at least at the tactical level. While the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong enjoyed initial successes with their surprise attacks, allied forces quickly overcame their initial shock and responded rapidly and forcefully, driving back the enemy in most areas. The first surge of the initial phase of the offensive was over by the end of February and most of these battles were over in a few days. There were, however, a few notable exceptions—fighting continued to rage in the Chinese section of Saigon, at Hue, and also at Khe Sanh—battles in which the allies eventually prevailed as well.

In the end, allied forces used superior mobility and firepower to rout the enemy troops, who failed to hold any of their military objectives. Additionally, the South Vietnamese troops, rather than fold, as the North Vietnamese had expected, acquitted themselves reasonably well. As for the much anticipated general uprising of the South Vietnamese populace, it never materialized.

During the bitter fighting that extended into the fall, the Communists sustained staggering casualties. Conservative estimates put their losses at more than 40,000 killed in action with an additional 7,000 captured. By September, when the subsequent phases of the offensive had run their course, the Viet Cong, who had borne the brunt of the heaviest fighting in the cities, had been dealt a significant blow from which they never really recovered the major fighting for the rest of the war would be done by the North Vietnamese Army from late 1969 until the end of the war.

The casualty figures during Tet for the allied forces were much lower, but they were still high. On 18 February, MACV posted the highest US casualty figure for a single week during the entire war—543 killed and 2,500 wounded. Total U.S. killed in action figures for the period February to March, 1968, were over a thousand. These casualty figures continued to mount as subsequent phases of the offensive extended into the fall. By the end of the year, U.S. killed in action for 1968 totaled more than 15,000.

Allied losses combined with the sheer scope and ferocity of the offensive and the vivid images of the savage fighting on the nightly TV news stunned the American people, who were astonished that the enemy was capable of such an effort. Their president and the senior US general in Vietnam had told them only two months before that the enemy was on its last legs and that the war was near an end. The intense and disturbing scenes depicted on the nightly TV news told a different story—a situation which added greatly to the growing credibility gap between the people and the administration. Having accepted the administration’s optimistic reports, but now confronted with a different reality, many Americans concluded that we were losing or at best locked in a bloody stalemate with no end in sight.

The Tet Offensive also had a major impact on Lyndon Johnson, who was visibly shaken by the turn of events. Although General Westmoreland rightfully claimed a great victory in the heavy fighting that continued into the fall of 1968, Johnson, like the American people, was stunned by the ability of the Communists to launch such wide-spread attacks. When Westmoreland, urged on by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Earle Wheeler, asked for 206,000 troops to “take advantage of the situation,” the president balked and began to consider alternative courses of action.

Johnson turned to a group of unofficial advisors known as the “Wise Men.” This was a group of senior statesmen and retired generals to whom he had turned in the past for advice and support. He had met with them in mid-1967 and they recommended that he stay the course in Vietnam. However, when he convened the group in March 1968, they almost unanimously recommended that he find a way to disengage from the war in Vietnam. Stunned by this reversal, Johnson charged Clark Clifford, who had replaced Robert McNamara as Secretary of Defense, to conduct a study to determine the way ahead in Vietnam.

In a very real sense, the Tet Offensive fractured the administration’s “shakey” consensus on the conduct of the war and the reassessment that Johnson ordered permitted the airing of new alternatives. The civilians in the Pentagon recommended that allied efforts focus on population security and that the South Vietnamese be forced to assume more responsibility for the fighting while the US pursued a negotiated settlement. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, not surprisingly, took exception to this approach and recommended that Westmoreland be given the troops that he had asked for and be permitted to pursue enemy forces into Laos and Cambodia.

While the way ahead was being debated within the administration, public opinion polls on the President’s handling of the war continued to spiral downward. In the New Hampshire democratic primary, Johnson barely defeated challenger Senator Eugene McCarthy, winning by only 300 votes—a situation which convinced Robert Kennedy to enter the presidential race as an antiwar candidate.

Beset politically by challengers within his own party and seemingly still in shock from the spectacular Tet attacks, on 31 March, Johnson went on national television to address the nation. He then stunned the audience by announcing that he would not run for re-election—The Tet Offensive had claimed its most important victim—the sitting president of the United States.

In the aftermath of Johnson’s announcement, chaos reigned at the Democratic National Convention in downtown Chicago. Eventually, Vice President Hubert Humphrey won the democratic nomination. The following November, Richard Nixon won the presidential election and began the long U.S. bloody withdrawal from Vietnam.

In summary, The Tet Offensive of 1968 was a turning point in the war in Vietnam. Westmoreland and other senior officials were blinded to the indications that a countrywide offensive was imminent because these indications did not conform to their preconceived notions about enemy capabilities and allied progress in the war. Even after the offensive was launched, the initial reaction at Westmoreland’s headquarters was to place the attacks within the framework of those notions, seeing them as diversionary actions meant to focus attention away from what was seen as the main objective—the Marine base at Khe Sanh. Thus, MACV was not prepared when the enemy offensive was launched.

In the case of the Tet Offensive, intelligence became an extension of Westmoreland’s optimism and LBJ’s need to show progress—not an accurate reflection of the enemy’s capabilities. This set the stage for the impact of the enemy’s surprise attacks in Tet 1968. Johnson and Westmoreland built a set of expectations – false, as it turned out — about the situation in Vietnam in order to win public support for the administration’s handling of the war and dampen antiwar sentiment. These expectations, based on severely flawed intelligence, played a major role in the stunning impact of the Tet Offensive. When the Tet Offensive exploded on 30-31 January, the resulting loss of credibility for the president and the military high command in Saigon was devastating. At that point, the fact that the allied forces had prevailed in 1968 was rendered irrevelant.


What caused the turning point in Hundred Years' War? - Geskiedenis

The Hundred Years War was fought between England and France and lasted from 1337 to 1453. The war was a series of battles with long periods of peace in between.

Small disputes and battles had been going on between the French and the English for years. However, in 1337, King Edward III of England claimed that he was the rightful king of France. This began the long battle between the two countries.

Other disputes kept the fighting going for over one hundred years. These included the control of the valuable wool trade, disputes over certain areas of land, and the support for Scotland by the French.


Slag van Agincourt from Chroniques d'Enguerrand de Monstrelet

King Edward III believed that he was the rightful heir to the French crown through his mother Isabella. He first laid claim to the throne when he was fifteen years old and King Charles IV of France died without a male heir. Instead of Edward, the French chose Philip to be their king.

When King Philip VI of France took control of Aquitaine from the English in 1337, King Edward III decided to fight back. He decided to invade France and reassert his right to the French throne.

Edward did not attempt to conquer and control the land of the French. Instead he led raids into the land called chevauchées. He would strike deep into the land of the French burning crops, plundering cities, and causing havoc.

In the 1350s, the army of King Edward III was led by his son, the valiant Edward the "Black Prince". The Black Prince became a famous hero to the English and was known for his chivalry. The Black Prince led the English to major victories over the French. At the battle of Poitiers, the Black Prince captured King John II, the current King of France.

King Edward agreed to release King John II for a ransom of three million crowns and some additional land. When King Edward died, the son of the Black Prince, Richard II became King. He was only 10 years old. There was a period of relative peace between England and France.

When King Henry V became king of England in 1413, he once again laid claim to the throne of France. He invaded France and won a decisive battle at Agincourt where with only around 6,000 soldiers he defeated a much larger French force of around 25,000. Eventually, the French gave in and King Charles VI named Henry as the heir to the throne.

Many of the people in southern France did not accept English rule. In 1428 the English began to invade southern France. They began a siege of the city of Orleans. However, a young peasant girl by the name of Joan of Arc took leadership of the French army. She claimed to have seen a vision from God. She led the French to a victory at Orleans in 1429. She led the French to several more victories before she was captured by the English and burned at the stake.

The French were inspired by Joan of Arc's leadership and sacrifice. They continued to fight back. They pushed the English army out of France taking Bordeaux in 1453 signaling the end of the Hundred Years War.


5. The Battle of Castillon: 17 July 1453

Under Henry VI, England lost most of the gains of Henry V. A force attempted to regain them but was dealt a crushing defeat at Castillon, with high casualties as a result of poor leadership from John Talbot, Earl of Shrewsbury. The battle is noted in the development of warfare as being the first battle in Europe in which field artillery (cannons) played a major role.

For all their victories during the war at Crecy, Poitiers and Agincourt, the loss at Castillon saw England lose all their territories in France, except for Calais which remained in English hands until 1558. The battle is considered by most to mark the end of the Hundred Years War, although this would not necessarily have seemed obvious to contemporaries. King Henry VI had a major mental breakdown later in 1453: many consider the news of the defeat at Castillon to have been a trigger.


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